ICL Declaration on Kurdistan

We publish a corrected version of the declaration by the International Communist League (ICL).

From the “Call for Peace and Democratic Society” to the PKK’s 12th Congress. The Completed Process of Liquidation Strategic Disintegration and Ideological Capitulation

The PKK’s 12th Congress and Abdullah Öcalan’s “Call for Peace and Democratic Society” should not be evaluated merely as a tactical shift or an organizational restructuring. They must be understood as the concrete expression of a qualitative rupture within the ideological line of the movement. This orientation represents a clear break from the historical revolutionary character of the Kurdish national liberation struggle and from its strategy of political independence based on the principle of the right of nations to self-determination (RNSD). It also reflects an effort toward ideological reconstruction and integration into the existing system.

Concepts such as “democratic nation,” “common homeland,” “moral political society,” “democratic confederalism,” and “stateless solution,” while seemingly offering alternative models to existing forms of power, rest on a postmodernist approach that rejects revolutionary strategy, class struggle, the right of the oppressed to armed struggle and resistance against tyranny, and the struggle for national independence. In this way, they form the foundation of a liquidationist ideology aimed at genuine liberation movements of oppressed peoples and nations.

The 12th Congress and the accompanying calls distort the legitimacy of the Kurdish nation’s struggle that has been waged since the 20th century. They define this struggle as a “cycle of violence,” label armed resistance as “a burden of the old paradigm,” and claim that the new era must be shaped on the basis of a “democratic, moral and peaceful solution.” Yet this position denies the collective historical resistance of the Kurdish nation, which remains under the occupation of annexationist and colonial states across the four parts of Kurdistan. This approach treats the nation-state not as an instrument of class domination, but merely as “the institutionalization of male dominated mentality,” sliding into an idealist line that explains history through abstract ethical crises rather than class struggles.

Beginning in 1999, the ideological line gradually developed by Abdullah Öcalan broke from the armed struggle, anti-colonialism, and socialist influences adopted by the PKK during the 1980s and 1990s. It evolved into a position that no longer contradicts the restructuring policies of the imperialist system and in some cases overlaps with them. The 12th Congress marks the final institutionalization and political declaration of this ideological reconstruction.

The discourse advanced under the name of “democratic solution” serves to deny the annexationist and occupationist character of the Turkish bourgeois feudal state and to delegitimize the Kurdish nation’s right to self-defense. Within this discourse, the century-long policies of annihilation, assimilation, exile and systematic repression imposed on the Kurdish nation by the Turkish state are reduced to “authoritarianism” or “nationalist deviation,” while the class nature of the state is ignored. Öcalan’s ideological system offers no class analysis of this structure. The Turkish state is portrayed not as an occupying and annexationist apparatus but as an actor capable of “transformation through dialogue.” This contradicts both MLM principles of analysis and the historical experience of the Kurdish nation.
Negotiations with the state have not produced any real change in the fundamental policies of the Turkish bourgeois feudal state. Through this ideological line, the legitimacy of revolutionary struggle is effectively withdrawn. Elevating peace from a tactic to a strategy demonstrates that Öcalan’s line has taken a systematic ideological position against class war and revolutionary violence.

Likewise, the PKK’s decision to dissolve itself and end the armed struggle signifies the internalization of conditions long imposed by the Turkish state and their unilateral implementation. The call made to the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) and political parties in the Congress declaration, along with the expectation that the state might assume a “historic role,” reflects an acceptance of the legitimacy of the existing colonial structure.

Öcalan’s anti socialist stance is not just a theoretical divergence. It constitutes a liquidation of the ideological foundations of revolutionary struggle. This approach dismisses Marxist class theory as “dogmatism of the old world” and proposes concepts such as “moral society,” “free individual” and “mythological consciousness.” By rejecting the historical materialist basis of socialism, it centers an idealist, individualist and culturalist framework shaped by imperialist ideologies, especially postmodernism.

For this reason, the 12th Congress and the “Call for Peace and Democratic Society” represent not a text of reconciliation, but a process of liquidation that abandons the revolutionary line, class struggle, socialism and the national liberation perspective. This line not only legitimizes the existing policies of the Turkish state, but also invalidates the Kurdish nation’s anti occupation and anti annexationist self-defense struggle, and condemns socialism as “a repressive remnant of the past.” Öcalan’s opposition to statist solutions effectively denies the temporary necessity of the proletarian state as the revolutionary power of the oppressed.

To limit this development to internal debates within the Kurdish national movement is to underestimate its objective significance. A movement such as the PKK, which for decades waged revolutionary struggle against imperialism, annexationism colonialism and fascism, entering such a trajectory affects not only the Kurdish nation but also the broader movements of the region.

The Meaning of the Liquidation Process from an MLM Perspective

The orientation declared through the PKK’s 12th Congress and Abdullah Öcalan’s “Call for Peace and Democratic Society” does not represent merely an organizational transformation within a national movement. It also represents a qualitative liquidation. This liquidation constitutes a direct attack on the principle of revolutionary violence, on the construction of national liberation on the basis of independence, and on the legitimate struggle and armed resistance of oppressed peoples and nations against ruling classes. This aspect of Öcalan’s line reflects not only a break from the past of the Kurdish movement, but also a form of postmodernist, reformist and pacifist assault on revolutionary theory. In this sense, it has become part of the universal counteroffensive of the bourgeoisie.

MLM defines revolutionary strategy clearly and comprehensively through key concepts such as the dictatorship of the proletariat, revolutionary violence, people’s war and the right of oppressed nations to self-determination. The strategy of People’s War developed by Mao Zedong emphasizes that the struggles waged by oppressed nations against imperialism and feudalism are not merely defensive but offensive processes aimed at revolutionary power. Mao characterizes this as the inevitable form of revolution in colonial and semi colonial countries. This war is not only an armed confrontation but also the ideological, political and military mobilization of the people and the nation.

However, the line of Abdullah Öcalan and the PKK’s 12th Congress develops an ideological opposition to all of these universal revolutionary principles. Concepts such as “overcoming armed struggle,” “making peaceful solution the strategic basis,” “stateless democracy” and “free individual” directly target the MLM strategy of revolution grounded in class struggle.

In this understanding, the state is reduced to merely a form of domination, and “democratic compromise” is proposed in place of the organized violence of the people. In this way, the class character of the state becomes blurred and the struggle is placed within a reformist framework. MLM’s historical practice highlights the counterrevolutionary character of liquidationism. Lenin centered the necessity of armed uprising and revolutionary organization against the Menshevik liquidationists, defining pacifism as an ideological tool of the bourgeois class. Mao Zedong condemned the bourgeois liberal theses of “peaceful evolution” during the Chinese revolution and built the ideological foundation of the line of People’s War by opposing such tendencies.

Therefore, the PKK’s characterization of armed struggle as “a burden of the past” and its presentation of guerrilla warfare as “a negative historical experience” is not merely a tactical preference, but an ideological attack on the ideal of socialism.

Another dimension of this rupture becomes evident in the relations established with imperialism. According to MLM, imperialism is the primary enemy of the peoples of the world, and the liberation struggles of oppressed nations must be waged against it. Yet Öcalan’s line reverses this fundamental principle and advances a political orientation integrated into the regional restructuring projects of imperialism.

In the case of Rojava, the relations established with the US led imperialist coalition can be explained not by revolutionary struggle but by the effort to attain a position within the system. Rather than tactical military cooperation, a strategic relationship of dependency was established, turning the Kurdish movement from a revolutionary subject into an actor positioned within imperialist power dynamics.
The paradigm that Öcalan developed after 1999 targets MLM’s theoretical core concepts and proposes a new philosophical basis centered on mythological consciousness, moral society, free individual and stateless solution. Although these concepts appear to offer a “revolutionary” innovation, they actually substitute cultural reform for class struggle, individual conscience for collective people’s movement, and systemic adaptation for revolutionary rupture.

According to MLM, the renewal of revolutionary movements is possible only by maintaining their ideological essence while adapting tactically to new conditions. This means expanding the struggle with tactical flexibility without deviating from strategic goals. Öcalan’s line, however, abandons strategic revolutionary goals completely and ideologically reconciles with the reformist projects of the imperialist system. This line rests on the assumption that “revolution is impossible” and prioritizes the transformation of the system instead of the people. The discourse of “stateless society,” “non violent solution” and “pluralism based on identities” expresses this reconciliatory reformist orientation.
The liquidation process manifests not only on a theoretical level but also on an organizational one. The PKK’s decision to end the armed struggle leads to the replacement of the organizational form with structures operating entirely within the system. The form of struggle proposed under the name of “democratic politics” means withdrawing into legally sanctioned spaces defined by the state, producing opposition limited to parliamentary frameworks and renouncing self-defense.

MLM asserts that the fundamental force of revolutionary transformation is the people, but the people are not understood merely as a cultural identity. They are a class defined, organized, armed and conscious subject. Öcalan’s line, however, approaches the people as a cultural entity and proposes to liberate them through “ethical transformation.” This approach pacifies the revolutionary nature of the people and removes them from being a subject. Concepts such as “conscience,” “ethics” and “self-governance” replace class war with an idealist and individualist worldview.

Throughout history, MLM has understood ideological struggle against liquidationism as part of the class struggle. Lenin’s struggle against the Mensheviks, Mao’s struggle against right opportunist lines and İbrahim’s struggle against revisionism are historical examples of this. The PKK’s current line should be evaluated as a similar liquidationist movement. The MLM stance toward this process should not only be criticism but also revolutionary reconstruction and ideological resistance.

The Rejection of the Kurdish Nation’s Right to Self-Determination

The right of the Kurdish nation to self-determination (RNSD) is both historically and in the present one of the most fundamental principles of the Kurdish nation’s struggle for freedom. From the perspective of Marxist Leninist theory, the Right of Nations to Self-Determination (RNSD) constitutes the legitimate and revolutionary basis of the resistance of oppressed nations against national oppression. This right is not limited to cultural recognition or local self-governance; it also includes, when necessary, the right to secede and to establish an independent state.

However, the orientation expressed in Abdullah Öcalan’s line and in the PKK’s 12th Congress openly rejects this fundamental right. In its place it proposes an integrationist policy framed through concepts such as “stateless solution,” “common homeland” and “democratic nation.” This constitutes not merely an ideological shift but the declaration of a historical capitulation.

Lenin defined the RNSD as the right of oppressed nations to determine their own future. He argued that denying this right strengthens the chauvinism of the oppressor nation and weakens revolutionary solidarity, and he stated that proletarian internationalism requires recognizing the right of oppressed nations to secede. For Lenin, a nation can be free only if all nations are free. Therefore, this right is not simply a theoretical recognition but a practical principle of struggle. The demand for independence is an inseparable part of the anti imperialist and anti colonial struggle waged for a revolutionary purpose.
The Kurdish nation lives under the systematic oppression of annexationist, occupationist, denialist and assimilationist regimes, despite differences in form. In the case of Turkey, this oppression has taken the form of a total policy directed against language, identity, territory and social organization. From the establishment of the Turkish bourgeois feudal state shaped by the Lausanne Treaty and the 1924 Constitution, the Kurdish nation has been legally denied, physically repressed and ideologically demonized.

From its founding in 1978, the PKK waged a revolutionary struggle against this structure with the aim of realizing the Right of Nations to Self-Determination (RNSD), embodied in the perspective of an independent, united, democratic and socialist Kurdistan. However, after 1999, the line developed by Öcalan broke from this fundamental perspective. It labeled the goal of establishing a state as a “state obsession,” portrayed the Kurdish nation’s quest for freedom as “a trap of nationalist tendencies,” and claimed that freedom would be achieved through the construction of a democratic society without a state.
Though this approach may appear radical at first glance, it actually represents an ideological orientation that dulls the idea of independence and liberation and encourages reconciliation with the annexationist and occupationist system. A stateless solution does not aim at overthrowing existing occupying and annexationist states, but seeks transformation within them. The struggle of the oppressed nation is confined to narrow frameworks such as local assemblies and self governance.

In this context, the discourse of “common homeland” functions as an ideological reproduction of the Turkish state’s thesis of “indivisible unity.” Öcalan’s claim that “the Kurds are not condemned to statelessness, and freedom will in fact be won through statelessness” aligns with the official Turkish ideology, which defines the right to secession as a “cause of war.” This represents not only the rejection of a revolutionary right, but also the recognition of the historical and ideological legitimacy of the annexationist and occupationist state. In this approach, the historical resistance of the Kurdish nation is reduced to the level of “identity reform,” while the indivisible unity of sovereign power is implicitly accepted.

Öcalan’s line withdraws the revolutionary right of the Kurdish nation to secede and instead seeks a solution based on partnership with Turkish sovereignty. The goal of this approach is not only reconciliation with the Turkish state, but also positioning itself as an acceptable actor within the global system by gaining the confidence of imperialist powers. Concepts such as “stateless democracy,” “pluralism” and “ecological society” coincide with the hegemonic ideological structures of the contemporary imperialist system. Rather than offering a transformative critique of capitalist modernity, they become proposals for an “alternative model of governance” compatible with it.
In practical terms, this results in replacing forms of struggle centered on the revolutionary violence of the people with a movement that collaborates with international NGOs, demands reform based on identities and remains confined to local democracy. Thus, fundamental revolutionary principles such as the RNSD dissolve within a postmodern understanding of “localism.”

In Öcalan’s theory, what is placed in the position of the RNSD is the “moral transformation of the free individual.” This removes the people from being a collective revolutionary subject and reduces their struggle from the historical, class and political realm to the moral realm. According to MLM, the people are a subject that determines its destiny collectively and does so through class struggle. The right to secede is the state form of this subject’s will. Lenin stated that “the most revolutionary way to struggle against national oppression is to openly defend the right of the oppressed nation to secede,” and argued that this right must be recognized by revolutionaries of both the oppressed and the oppressor nation.
The decisions of the PKK’s 12th Congress declare that this right is no longer defended organizationally. The decision to dissolve the PKK and end the armed struggle demonstrates that this line has turned into a de facto capitulation, not only an ideological one. The calls made to the Turkish Grand National Assembly in the Congress declarations express recognition of the legitimacy of the Turkish state. Ending guerrilla warfare represents the abandonment of self-defense. Together, these show clearly that Öcalan’s line has liquidated the RNSD.

The theoretical and political outcome of this liquidation is the confinement of the Kurdish national struggle within the framework of occupying and annexationist states. Instead of revolutionary rupture, a reformist integration is proposed. This aligns with the “conflict resolution” strategies implemented by the imperialist system in the region. In this model, local actors are brought under control, identity-based demands are stripped of their class character, and systemic transformation is promoted. This model overlaps entirely with the political program proposed by Öcalan’s line.

The Legitimation of the Annexationist and Occupationist Structure of the Turkish State
From its founding, the Republic of Turkey was constructed according to the interests of the Turkish ruling classes within a multi national geography. It emerged not only as a reproducer of capitalist relations of production, but also as an apparatus of domination that established the sovereignty of the Turkish nation over the Kurdish nation and other peoples and national communities through force. Annexationism in Turkey is not an external political form, but a founding characteristic embedded in the internal structure of the state, its legal system, its educational apparatus, its administrative organization, its ideology and its historical memory. For this reason, the Turkish state is both the primary obstacle to the Kurdish nation’s right to self-determination and the historical class dictatorship tasked with continuously obstructing the exercise of this right.

According to Marxist Leninist Maoist theory, nation states are structures through which the bourgeoisie institutionalizes its own market and class domination. The establishment of the Republic of Turkey was not a bourgeois revolution. Rather, it was the reorganization of the centralized, military sultanic structure inherited from the Ottoman Empire according to the needs of the modern bourgeoisie. This reorganization began with the destruction of the non Muslim peoples of Anatolia (Armenians, Greeks, Assyrians) and was institutionalized through systematic policies of repression against the Kurdish nation. From the 1925 Sheikh Said Uprising to the 1937 to 1938 Dersim Massacre, from the 1980 military coup to the village burnings and evacuations of the 1990s, the Turkish state has used armed violence in every period to suppress the struggle of the Kurdish nation.

Despite this clear historical reality, Abdullah Öcalan’s line and the PKK’s 12th Congress reject or obscure the colonial character of the Turkish state. Concepts and propositions such as “common homeland,” “democratic compromise,” “appeal to the Turkish Grand National Assembly,” and “the state’s capacity for democratic transformation” have become ideological tools serving this legitimation. The systematic repression of the annexationist and occupationist state is reframed as “isolated mistakes,” “bad governance” or “nationalist deviations,” and the state is presented as a structure that can be transformed through reform.

Öcalan’s claim that “the state can be reformed” is concrete evidence that his line deliberately avoids a class based analysis of the state. The state is the instrument through which the ruling class maintains its power through force. In the case of Turkey, this ruling class consists of the Turkish comprador bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the large landowners, organized through its army, bureaucracy, intelligence apparatus and security forces.

The Kurdish nation is the direct target of this apparatus. The state systematically uses all legal and illegal means to prevent the Kurdish nation from exercising its right to self-determination. This structure cannot be transformed through reforms or constitutional improvements. It can only be overthrown through revolutionary rupture.

However, Öcalan repeatedly expresses his belief in the possibility of the state’s transformation. Through discourses such as “new constitution,” “democratic self governance” and “parliamentary representation,” he prioritizes searching for a solution within the existing structure. The statement in the PKK’s 12th Congress that “the Parliament has a historic responsibility” reflects the concrete manifestation of this line. This approach, having departed from revolutionary essence, becomes a position that serves the reproduction of the existing class structure.

Öcalan’s line attempts to bury the policies of denial, annihilation and assimilation imposed by the Turkish state against the Kurdish nation in the dusty pages of history. This legitimation becomes most visible in Öcalan’s interpretation of the Lausanne Treaty and the 1924 Constitution. While he defines these as the basis of Kurdish denial, he frames his search for a solution in the period before this history, referring nostalgically to an alleged “Turkish Kurdish partnership” during the founding period of the Republic. Yet, from an MLM perspective, the liberation of a nation is rooted not in the history of the state that oppresses it, but in its own history of struggle.

The Lausanne Treaty and the 1924 Constitution represent periods during which not only the Kurds but all peoples of Turkey were placed under oppression, and the absolute domination of the bourgeois feudal ruling classes was established. Referring to these periods as the basis for a “common homeland” means turning one’s back on the national resistance history of the Kurdish nation.

One of Öcalan’s main claims regarding the Turkish state is that the “authoritarian mentality” must be overcome. This assessment relies on an ideological approach rooted in the individualistic concept of freedom of bourgeois liberalism and obscures the class character of the state. The discourse of “mentality change” is a reductionist approach that attempts to explain the structural violence of the state through psychological, cultural or individual reasons. Yet the Turkish state did not arise from the bad intentions of individuals or traditional cultural tendencies. It is the direct product of class interests and of integration with the imperialist system.

This legitimation also serves the interests of imperialist powers. Öcalan’s relationship with the Turkish state within the framework of “peace process” and “dialogue” is not a revolutionary resistance against a NATO aligned state structure. It is a political program aimed at adapting to it. The Turkish state is one of NATO’s most important military structures and serves as an advanced outpost of the imperialist system in the Middle East. Expecting a “democratic transformation” from such a state is an offer of reconciliation to imperialism. This means integrating the national liberation struggle into the imperialist system.

The practical consequences of this line can be observed in Rojava. Even in the self governance structures built in Rojava, efforts were made to avoid direct confrontation with the Turkish state. Strategic relations were established with the United States, and “soft transition” models were promoted. All of this illustrates the tendency within Öcalan’s line to avoid open conflict with colonial state structures.
A political line built on reform within the Turkish state implicitly accepts imperialist encirclement and the continuity of the bourgeois state. This harms not only the Kurdish nation but the struggle for freedom of all peoples in Turkey. Without exposing the occupationist and annexationist character of the Turkish state, any appeal to “democratic politics” remains trapped within the boundaries of the bourgeois system.

The Anti-Socialist, Postmodern and Idealist Character of Öcalan’s Ideological Line

Abdullah Öcalan’s ideological line is presented as a “new paradigm” that claims to overcome both the classical nation state and classical socialist models. However, when examined through an MLM framework, this paradigm appears not as a revolutionary innovation but as an ideological orientation shaped by postmodernism, individualism and bourgeois liberalism. This orientation abandons the class struggle that lies at the heart of socialist theory and replaces it with concepts centered on identity, morality and culture.

Thus, Öcalan’s line is not merely a deviation within the Kurdish national movement. It represents an anti socialist ideological program aligned with the contemporary counterrevolutionary offensive of imperialism.

One of the most striking elements of this program is its direct attack on Marxist theory. Öcalan defines Marxism as the “dogmatic ideology of the old world,” claims that Marxist analysis is reductionist, and removes class struggle from the center of revolutionary practice. According to Öcalan, the fundamental contradiction of society is not between classes, but between “state based power” and “moral political society.” This is an idealist approach that transforms the material contradictions of society into moral and cultural categories.

From an MLM perspective, this is a liquidation of historical materialism. The state is not only a moral problem, but an instrument of the ruling class. Society is divided into classes based on relations of production, and revolution is the overthrow of ruling classes by the people through organized violence. By ignoring this structure, Öcalan’s line rejects the core of scientific socialism.

Another important dimension of this ideological rupture is Öcalan’s interpretation of history. Öcalan proposes a historical narrative in which the “original state of society” was communal, moral and peaceful, and claims that class society emerged through “the betrayal of male dominated power.” Although this narrative appears radical on the surface, it is idealist. It turns history into a moral conflict detached from material contradictions. Öcalan’s theory accepts the existence of class society but explains its emergence through psychological and cultural concepts rather than economic structures.
MLM asserts that history is shaped by the development of productive forces, the relations of production and the class struggle that arises from them. In Öcalan’s theory, these dynamics are replaced with concepts such as “sacred mother woman,” “mythological mentality” and “ethical society.” These concepts detach the historical processes of society from material relations and direct them into the realm of cultural and moral abstractions. For this reason, Öcalan’s “new paradigm” is not a synthesis beyond socialism, but an idealist framework that rejects socialism.

Another fundamental pillar of Öcalan’s ideology is its postmodern character. Concepts such as “identity,” “plurality,” “local governance,” “individual freedom,” “ethics” and “difference” form the theoretical vocabulary of postmodernism. These concepts do not target capitalist class relations, but seek to expand the space of identity based politics within the system. Thus, political subjects are fragmented into identities, and class struggle is replaced with cultural recognition.

From the perspective of MLM, identity politics is one of the ideological tools the bourgeoisie uses to disorganize revolutionary movements. Öcalan’s line transforms the struggle of the Kurdish nation, which historically has been a national liberation struggle, into a cultural identity movement. It confines the right to self determination to the realm of “cultural autonomy” and attempts to reconstruct liberation around concepts such as “free individual” and “ethical stance.”

Öcalan assigns a central role to morality in his ideological system. He often claims that “revolutions without moral transformation will fail” and asserts that political struggle must be grounded not in class struggle but in “ethical awakening.” While morality inevitably plays a role in every revolutionary movement, replacing class struggle with morality is a direct rejection of scientific socialism. Morality is shaped by material conditions. Without transforming material structures, the moral transformation Öcalan emphasizes remains an individual idealism.

Another important aspect of Öcalan’s line is its pacifist orientation. The emphasis on “overcoming armed struggle,” “strategic peace,” “social solution,” and “civil politics” reveals Öcalan’s systematic ideological stance against revolutionary violence. Öcalan repeatedly describes revolutionary violence as “a patriarchal invention.” This removes revolutionary violence from its historical and material context and places it within a moral psychological framework. From the perspective of scientific socialism, revolutionary violence is the organized force of the people against the ruling classes. Denying this means stripping the oppressed classes and nations of the possibility of liberation.

The anti socialist and postmodern character of Öcalan’s ideology also manifests in its political goals. Concepts such as “stateless solution,” “democratic confederalism,” and “radical democracy” do not aim at destroying capitalism. They aim at creating an alternative administrative model within capitalism. These models seek to reform the system, not to overthrow it. For this reason, Öcalan’s line is frequently embraced by liberal, postmodern and anarchist circles and is accepted by international institutions as a model of “democratic governance.”

The fact that Öcalan’s ideological system is embraced by imperialist institutions, global NGO networks and Western academic circles is not accidental. Imperialism encourages models that neutralize revolutionary movements, separate them from armed struggle and integrate them into identity based frameworks. In this sense, Öcalan’s “new paradigm” is compatible with the “soft power” strategies of imperialism and is embraced as an acceptable model.

In conclusion, Öcalan’s line is not a revolutionary paradigm. It is an anti socialist ideological program shaped by postmodernism, idealism and reformism. It rejects historical materialism, removes class struggle from the center, defines the people as a cultural identity rather than a class subject, and replaces revolutionary violence with moral transformation. Its political goal is not to overthrow the state but to transform it, and not to destroy capitalism but to humanize it.

The Rejection of Revolutionary Violence and the Denial of the Legitimacy of Armed Struggle
Revolutionary violence is one of the fundamental principles of Marxism Leninism Maoism. It is the organized force used by the oppressed classes and oppressed nations to topple the ruling classes and to break the state apparatus that maintains exploitation. Without revolutionary violence, no oppressed class in history has been able to liberate itself. This is a universal law confirmed by the historical practices of revolutions.

Abdullah Öcalan’s ideological line rejects this universal principle. This rejection is not merely a tactical choice. It expresses a systematic ideological stance. In Öcalan’s framework, armed struggle is described as “a product of the old male dominated mentality,” “a historical burden,” and “a method that no longer has meaning in the new era.” According to this approach, liberation cannot be achieved through revolutionary violence but through “dialogue,” “ethical transformation,” and “peace politics.”
Such an understanding opposes not only the armed struggle waged by the Kurdish nation but the legitimacy of all people’s revolutions throughout history. This makes Öcalan’s line not only a liquidationist orientation for the Kurdish national movement but also an ideological assault on the concept of revolution itself.

From an MLM perspective, revolutionary violence is not a moral preference. It is the inevitable and objective necessity of class struggle. The state is an instrument of violence used by the ruling classes. Therefore, the people cannot liberate themselves without overthrowing this instrument of violence. Lenin stated that the state cannot be dismantled through negotiations and must be smashed through revolutionary violence. Mao emphasized that the political power of the oppressed emerges from the barrel of a gun. Revolutionary violence means the organized uprising of the people against the ruling classes.

Öcalan’s line, however, interprets the state not as a class apparatus but as an institution that can be transformed through dialogue. This results in eliminating the revolutionary role of violence, reducing the people’s struggle to “democratic pressure,” and narrowing the entire liberation process to constitutional reforms. This is the elimination of the revolutionary content of the struggle.
The PKK’s historical struggle between 1984 and 1999 relied on guerrilla warfare and the organized force of the Kurdish nation. During this period, the Kurdish nation was able to resist the annihilation policies of the Turkish state precisely through revolutionary violence. Guerrilla warfare made the Kurdish nation a political subject, disrupted the colonial domination of the Turkish state, and made the Kurdish question an international issue. With the withdrawal from revolutionary violence after 1999, this process was reversed and the gains of a twenty five year struggle were gradually dissolved.
Öcalan’s stance also results in a distorted understanding of self defense. Öcalan describes self defense not as an armed and organized force of the people but as an abstract concept of “social consciousness.” According to this approach, societies will protect themselves not through armed resistance but through “ethics,” “awareness,” and “culture.” This is a utopian and idealist approach detached from material reality. In class societies, self defense is the organized force of the people. Without armed self defense, an oppressed nation cannot protect itself from the violence of occupying states.

The rejection of armed struggle is also expressed clearly in the decisions of the PKK’s 12th Congress. The call for the dissolution of the PKK, the declaration that guerrilla warfare has fulfilled its historical role, and the request addressed to the Turkish Grand National Assembly to play a role in the “democratic solution” demonstrate that Öcalan’s line rejects the legitimacy of guerrilla warfare. The unilateral inaction and disarmament calls that have been repeated since 1999 reflect the same orientation. These orientations do not force the Turkish state to withdraw its military forces. Instead, they disarm the Kurdish nation while leaving the state’s military power intact.

Öcalan’s approach also leads to the rejection of the revolutionary experience of the world’s oppressed nations. From the anti imperialist revolutions of Asia, Africa and Latin America to the national liberation struggles of Vietnam, China, Algeria and Cuba, all revolutionary movements have relied on revolutionary violence. Öcalan, however, defines these struggles as “historical burdens” and argues that the age of armed struggle has passed. This thesis is not only theoretically incorrect but also dangerous. It tells oppressed peoples that they should not resist through force and should instead seek their liberation through the institutions of the system.

This stance is welcomed by imperialist powers and occupying states. The pacification of revolutionary movements is one of the fundamental strategies of imperialism. The global “conflict resolution” model is shaped to neutralize armed liberation movements and integrate them into the system. Öcalan’s line overlaps entirely with this model. Concepts such as “peace process,” “non violence,” “soft transition,” and “compromise” correspond to the ideological needs of imperialism rather than to the revolutionary needs of oppressed nations.

The rejection of revolutionary violence also results in the liquidation of the organizational structure. Revolutionary organizations are built on discipline, secrecy, armed struggle and political determination. When armed struggle is rejected, these organizational principles are also abandoned. In place of a revolutionary organization, a loose, open, identity based, NGO like structure emerges. This is not a revolutionary transformation but the dissolution of the organization.

From an MLM perspective, the rejection of revolutionary violence means rejecting the possibility of revolution itself. With the abandonment of armed struggle, the Kurdish national movement is forced into the narrow and reformist channels of the system. Without revolutionary violence, the Kurdish nation cannot break the occupationist and annexationist structure of the Turkish state nor gain its political freedom.

The Dissolution of the PKK’s Organizational Structure and the Abandonment of the Party Form
One of the clearest indications of the liquidationist character of Abdullah Öcalan’s ideological line is the dissolution of the PKK’s organizational form. The PKK was founded as a Marxist Leninist organization that waged a national liberation struggle, used guerrilla warfare as its method, and based itself on a strict party discipline. The organizational principle of this structure rested on the Leninist concept of a vanguard party, which requires ideological unity, centralized organization, political clarity and revolutionary will.

However, after 1999, Öcalan’s line began to dismantle this organizational model step by step. This dismantling is not a renewal but a liquidation. Instead of the party form, structures without ideological unity, organizational discipline or revolutionary character were adopted.

In Öcalan’s ideological framework, the party is described as “a hierarchical structure built on domination,” “the product of statist mentality,” and “a patriarchal form.” According to this approach, the party must be replaced with “democratic society,” “self organizing communities,” and “ethical political networks.” These definitions show that Öcalan opposes not only the PKK as an organization but the party form itself. This opposition goes far beyond the Kurdish movement and reflects an anti party ideological stance identical to anarchist and postmodern currents.

From an MLM perspective, rejecting the party form means rejecting the revolution. Lenin defined the revolutionary party as the highest form of political organization of the proletariat and oppressed nations. Mao emphasized that without a revolutionary party, the revolution cannot succeed. The party does not represent domination but the organized force of the people. Without the party, neither revolutionary violence nor ideological struggle nor political clarity can exist. For this reason, anti party orientations are historically characteristic of liquidationist and opportunist lines.

The PKK’s 12th Congress marks the most explicit expression of this liquidation. The Congress documents describe the PKK as a “historical organization” that has completed its mission and claim that the new era requires “democratic politics” instead of the party. In this context, the PKK declares its intention to dissolve itself. This is not only an organizational decision but the culmination of a liquidationist ideological transformation.

The abandonment of the party form leads to the dissolution of the organizational structure. Instead of a centralized revolutionary organization, a loose and fragmented structure emerges. Terms such as “civil society,” “autonomous assemblies,” “confederal networks” and “communal mechanisms” denote structures that do not possess revolutionary discipline. While these models may appear democratic, they cannot serve as instruments of revolutionary struggle. Revolutionary struggle requires unity of will, centralized political leadership, and coordinated organizational force.

With the abandonment of the party, political strategy is also dissolved. Revolutionary strategy is replaced by a vague and ambiguous concept of “democratic politics.” This concept is not aimed at overthrowing the system but at influencing it. Öcalan defines democratic politics as “political struggle conducted without armed force, within civil fields, through dialogue and persuasion.” This turns political struggle into a reformist practice based on negotiation with the state.

The abandonment of the party form also leads to the loss of ideological clarity. The PKK, once grounded in Marxist Leninist theory, moved step by step away from this ideological base under the influence of Öcalan’s postmodernist and idealist paradigm. The ideological vacuum created by this shift was filled with eclectic and contradictory concepts. While Marx is criticized, Foucault is embraced; while class struggle is rejected, mythology is emphasized; while revolutionary violence is condemned, pacifism is adopted. Such eclecticism eliminates ideological unity and leaves the organization without a theoretical foundation.

At the same time, organizational discipline is replaced by spontaneity. In party based revolutionary movements, discipline is the guarantee of political will. It unites the organization under a common line. However, in Öcalan’s line, discipline is described as “authoritarianism,” and spontaneity is seen as “freedom.” This is an anarchist tendency. Revolutionary movements have historically collapsed wherever spontaneity replaced discipline. Organization transforms the will of the people into a revolutionary force. Without organization, the people cannot become a subject.

Another fundamental point is that the abandonment of the party form leads to integration with imperialist and state institutions. Non governmental organizations, international platforms, civil initiatives and identity based networks are not alternative structures to the party. They are forms of organization that function within the system. Öcalan’s model encourages such structures, and this integration leads to a complete severing of the revolutionary connection between the movement and the people.

In this sense, the abandonment of the party form is the abandonment of revolution. The PKK’s dissolution decision is not the reorganization of the movement but the destruction of its organizational backbone. Without the party, there can be no revolutionary strategy, no armed struggle, no ideological unity and no possibility of national liberation.

From an MLM perspective, the revolutionary struggle of the Kurdish nation can only continue through a vanguard party grounded in Marxism Leninism Maoism. All liquidationist tendencies must be rejected, and revolutionary continuity must be rebuilt on the basis of ideological clarity, political will and organized force.

The Integration of the Kurdish National Question into the Imperialist System

One of the most critical dimensions of the liquidationist line developed by Abdullah Öcalan is the integration of the Kurdish national question into the restructuring strategies of the imperialist system in the Middle East. This integration is not an accidental or tactical development. It is the political conclusion of Öcalan’s ideological shift, which rejects socialism, revolutionary violence, the Right of Nations to Self-Determination and the party form.

From an MLM perspective, imperialism is the primary enemy of the peoples and oppressed nations of the world. National liberation struggles are revolutionary to the extent that they resist the political, military and economic domination of imperialism. Any national movement that aligns itself with imperialism loses its revolutionary character and turns into an extension of imperialist policies.

After 1999, Öcalan’s line transformed the Kurdish national struggle from an anti imperialist movement into a political actor integrated into imperialist projects. Concepts such as “radical democracy,” “local governance,” “peaceful solution,” “stateless model,” and “confederal networks” overlapped with the ideological needs of the United States and Europe in the region. These concepts were embraced by Western institutions because they weakened revolutionary tendencies within the Kurdish movement and made it compatible with the regional strategies of imperialism.

The Rojava experience provides the most concrete example of this transformation. The United States established military and political relations with the self governance structures in Rojava, and these relations were presented not as tactical but as strategic developments. The establishment of military bases, joint operational coordination and long term security cooperation indicate that the Kurdish question has been integrated into the geopolitical strategies of the United States in the region. This integration reflects not the independent political will of the Kurdish nation but the strategic priorities of imperialism.

Öcalan’s ideological influence played a decisive role in this process. Because Öcalan had already abandoned the perspective of national independence, he defined relations with imperialism not as a strategic threat but as a “necessary alliance.” This is a dangerous perspective. Revolutionary movements cannot build alliances with imperialism without losing their revolutionary character. The experiences of Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and many African countries have shown that imperialist powers use identity based actors to redesign regions and then leave them in deeper fragmentation and dependency.
The political program Öcalan proposed is entirely compatible with this imperialist strategy. The model of “democratic confederalism” is presented as an alternative to the nation state. However, this model does not disrupt imperialist domination. On the contrary, it is designed to decentralize and soften domination. By dissolving national liberation movements into identity based networks, imperialism prevents oppressed nations from gaining independent political power.

For this reason, democratic confederalism is not a revolutionary model. It is a postmodern governance model that serves the needs of imperialism in a multi ethnic region. It rejects the independent state, the revolutionary party, armed struggle and the Marxist Leninist ideological framework. Under these conditions, the struggle of the Kurdish nation becomes integrated into the frameworks defined by imperialism.

The integration process is also visible in the discourse of “peace process.” Imperialism presents peace initiatives not to support the liberation struggles of oppressed nations but to pacify those struggles and integrate them into the system. In this context, Öcalan’s insistence on “strategic peace” coincides with the policies of imperialist institutions. Concepts such as “dialogue,” “negotiation,” “constitutional reform,” and “local democracy” are used to eliminate revolutionary forces and strengthen the influence of imperialism in the region.

The fact that Western academic circles, international NGOs, global think tanks and European parliaments embrace Öcalan’s ideology is not coincidental. These institutions evaluate revolutionary movements not based on their goals but based on their compatibility with the capitalist system. A movement that rejects armed struggle, abandons the party form, renounces the Right of Nations to Self-Determination and transforms national liberation into identity politics is seen as “acceptable” by imperialism.

Thus, the Kurdish question becomes an object of imperialist policy rather than a revolutionary struggle. A national struggle that aims at independence and liberation disrupts the regional strategies of imperialism. However, an identity based movement that does not target the system and seeks recognition within it strengthens imperialist domination.

This integration also aligns with the needs of the Turkish state. Since Turkey is a NATO member and an advanced outpost of imperialism in the region, imperialism prefers a Kurdish movement that does not target the Turkish state and does not disrupt regional alliances. In this sense, the liquidationist line of Öcalan serves both imperialism and Turkey.

From an MLM perspective, the liberation of the Kurdish nation is incompatible with integration into imperialism. The Kurdish national question can only find a revolutionary solution through anti imperialist struggle, a Marxist Leninist Maoist vanguard party and people’s war. Any movement that rejects these loses its revolutionary character and becomes an extension of the system.

The Transformation of the Kurdish National Liberation Struggle into an Identity-Based Reform Movement
One of the deepest results of the ideological line developed by Abdullah Öcalan is the transformation of the Kurdish national liberation struggle into an identity-based reform movement. This transformation did not occur suddenly. It emerged step by step as a consequence of rejecting socialism, abandoning revolutionary violence, dissolving the party form, and integrating the Kurdish question into the system.
Historically, national liberation struggles have been revolutionary movements led by oppressed nations against occupying and annexationist states. Their goal is liberation, independence and political power. In the case of the Kurdish nation, the struggle has been waged against the century-long denial, assimilation, occupation and annihilation policies of the Turkish state and other regional states. Therefore, the Kurdish struggle is not merely a cultural struggle but a national struggle with a political and territorial dimension.

However, Öcalan’s ideological orientation breaks this historical framework and transforms the Kurdish question into a cultural identity issue. Concepts such as “democratic nation,” “stateless solution,” “ethical transformation,” “identity plurality,” and “moral political society” reduce the Kurdish national struggle to the level of identity-based reform. In this framework, the central goal is not national liberation but cultural recognition, local governance and coexistence within the existing state structures.
From an MLM perspective, this transformation is a fundamental ideological retreat. National liberation cannot be reduced to cultural identity. Nations are political entities defined by territory, economy, language, collective history and social organization. The struggle of an oppressed nation is the struggle to determine its own future. Identity politics, however, focuses on recognition within the system instead of aiming to transform the system. Thus, it is a reformist approach.

Öcalan’s concept of “democratic nation” blurs the material and political basis of the nation. In this concept, the nation is dissolved into cultural communities, identities and moral groups. While this may appear pluralistic, it eliminates the political will of the Kurdish nation as a nation. By rejecting the Right of Nations to Self-Determination, it transforms the Kurdish nation into a cultural community that seeks recognition rather than liberation.

This conceptual shift also reduces the struggle from class struggle to cultural expression. The Kurdish working class, peasants, poor people and laboring people lose their political identity as part of an oppressed nation and instead become part of broad and vague categories such as “society,” “community,” “moral individuals” and “democratic actors.” In this way, the political basis of the national struggle dissolves and is replaced by an identity-based framework without revolutionary content.

Identity-based approaches are compatible with the needs of imperialism and the state. Imperialism seeks to transform national questions into cultural issues to eliminate the possibility of revolutionary rupture. The Turkish state also prefers a Kurdish movement that demands cultural rights instead of national liberation. Öcalan’s line provides exactly this. The Kurdish question is disconnected from national liberation and is reframed as a cultural reform problem that can be addressed through constitutional changes.

This transformation is also visible in the organizational structure. Instead of a revolutionary party representing the political will of the Kurdish nation, identity-based platforms and broad civil society networks emerge. These structures cannot carry out revolutionary struggle. They function within the system and produce opposition limited to the boundaries of the bourgeois order.

The transformation of the Kurdish struggle into identity politics also results in the pacification of the people. The Kurdish nation becomes a passive community waiting for solutions from institutions such as parliament, constitutional commissions, international organizations and NGOs. This leads to the disappearance of the revolutionary will of the people. A people that abandons its ability to resist with its own force loses its capacity to act as a political subject.

From an MLM perspective, this transformation is liquidation. A national struggle that has emerged as a revolutionary force over decades is reduced to a cultural reform movement. The political goals of independence, secession, territorial unity and revolutionary transformation are replaced by concepts such as coexistence, dialogue and identity pluralism. These concepts do not challenge the system. They adapt to it.

The Kurdish national movement can only regain its revolutionary character through a political program based on the Right of Nations to Self-Determination, Marxism Leninism Maoism, people’s war, the vanguard party and anti imperialist struggle. Identity politics cannot liberate nations. It can only integrate them into the system. Liberation requires revolutionary rupture, not cultural recognition.

The Strategic Consequences of the Liquidationist Line for the Kurdish National Movement
The ideological and political line shaped by Abdullah Öcalan after 1999 and institutionalized through the PKK’s 12th Congress has produced strategic consequences that directly affect the historical course of the Kurdish national liberation struggle. These consequences are not temporary or tactical. They represent a long-term transformation that has reshaped the identity, goals and organizational structure of the movement.

From an MLM perspective, the strategic consequences of liquidationism can be summarized in several fundamental areas. Each of these areas represents a rupture from the revolutionary path historically followed by the Kurdish nation.

First, the Kurdish national liberation struggle has lost its strategic target. The PKK’s founding objective was to achieve the Right of Nations to Self-Determination for the Kurdish nation in the form of an independent, united and democratic Kurdistan. After 1999, this target was abandoned and replaced with vague political goals such as “democratic solution,” “peaceful coexistence,” “identity pluralism,” and “stateless democracy.” These goals do not provide a strategic direction for a national liberation movement. They dissolve the idea of national independence and reduce political struggle to reformist demands.

A movement that does not have a clear strategic target cannot maintain revolutionary continuity. Without a political goal that expresses the collective will of the nation, the movement becomes a loose aggregation of identities rather than a revolutionary subject.

Second, the Kurdish national movement has lost its revolutionary method. Armed struggle, which historically formed the backbone of the Kurdish people’s resistance, was redefined as a “burden of the old paradigm” and liquidated step by step. Guerrilla warfare, which had allowed the Kurdish nation to resist the colonial domination of the Turkish state, was replaced with concepts such as “democratic politics,” “social struggle,” and “dialogue.” This means abandoning revolutionary violence and confining the struggle to the political channels allowed by the system.

However, without revolutionary violence, an oppressed nation cannot break the political, military and economic structures that bind it. The liquidation of guerrilla warfare has weakened the self-defense capacity of the Kurdish nation.

Third, the Kurdish national movement has lost its organizational backbone. The dissolution of the PKK and the abandonment of the party form have resulted in the replacement of a disciplined revolutionary organization with a fragmented network of civil structures. A national liberation struggle cannot be carried out through NGOs, platforms or local assemblies. Revolutionary struggle requires a vanguard party with ideological clarity, organizational discipline and strategic leadership. Without the party, the movement loses its ability to act coherently and decisively.

Fourth, the Kurdish question has been integrated into the system. The liquidationist line does not target the occupationist and annexationist structure of the Turkish state. Instead, it seeks solutions within the framework of constitutional reforms, negotiations with the Turkish Parliament, and cooperation with imperialist institutions. This integration neutralizes the revolutionary content of the Kurdish question and turns it into a reform issue. In this way, the Kurdish national struggle becomes dependent on the political processes of the system instead of breaking them.

Fifth, the Kurdish national movement has been ideologically fragmented. Öcalan’s postmodern, idealist and identity-based paradigm has led to the dissolution of the movement’s ideological unity. Concepts such as “ethical society,” “mythological consciousness,” and “moral transformation” do not provide a scientific framework for revolutionary struggle. Instead, they introduce ambiguity and eclecticism. As a result, ideological clarity has been replaced with confusion.

Sixth, the revolutionary subject has been dissolved. The Kurdish people, who historically acted as a political subject through guerrilla warfare and revolutionary organization, have been transformed into passive actors waiting for peace processes, constitutional negotiations and international interventions. This results in the weakening of the collective revolutionary will of the Kurdish nation. A people that abandons resistance based on its own force gradually becomes dependent on external actors.
Seventh, the liquidationist line has created strategic dependency. The political, military and diplomatic relations established with the United States in Rojava and with European institutions through democratic politics have placed the Kurdish movement within the strategic orbit of imperialism. Imperialism does not support the liberation of oppressed nations. It supports movements that can serve its interests. This dependency eliminates the possibility of revolutionary autonomy.

Finally, the liquidationist line has led to the loss of revolutionary legitimacy. A movement that abandons national independence, rejects armed struggle, dissolves the party and relies on imperialist powers can no longer represent the interests of an oppressed nation. Revolutionary legitimacy comes from resisting the occupationist and annexationist state, not from seeking recognition within the system.

From an MLM perspective, these strategic consequences demonstrate that the Kurdish national movement is facing a deep ideological, political and organizational crisis. This crisis cannot be resolved through reformist solutions. It can only be overcome through the reconstruction of the revolutionary line based on Marxism Leninism Maoism, the Right of Nations to Self-Determination, the vanguard party and people’s war.

The Tasks of Reconstructing the Revolutionary Line

The liquidationist ideological, political and organizational orientation that has taken shape through Abdullah Öcalan’s line and the PKK’s 12th Congress has created a multidimensional crisis for the Kurdish national liberation struggle. This crisis cannot be resolved through reformist approaches, identity-based politics or parliamentary initiatives. The reconstruction of a revolutionary line is a historical necessity for the Kurdish nation and for the peoples of the region.

From an MLM perspective, the reconstruction of the revolutionary line is not an abstract call but a concrete political, ideological and organizational task. Each of these tasks concerns the rebuilding of a national liberation movement capable of resisting imperialism, feudalism, capitalism and the occupationist-annexationist state structure.

The first task is the ideological reconstruction of the movement. The liquidationist line must be rejected in all its intellectual foundations. Postmodernism, individualism, pacifism, identity politics and moralism cannot provide the ideological foundation for a revolutionary movement. The Kurdish national struggle can only regain its revolutionary character by returning to Marxism Leninism Maoism. MLM provides the scientific basis for understanding the class structure of society, the nature of national oppression, the role of imperialism and the strategy of people’s war. Without this ideological clarity, a revolutionary movement cannot be rebuilt.

The second task is the restoration of the Right of Nations to Self-Determination as the strategic goal of the Kurdish national struggle. National liberation cannot be reduced to cultural recognition or local administration. The Kurdish nation has the right to determine its own future, including the right to an independent state. This right must be openly defended against the Turkish state, against imperialism and against all liquidationist tendencies. Without the restoration of this principle, the Kurdish struggle remains trapped within reformist frameworks.

The third task is the reconstruction of the revolutionary party. Without a vanguard party, there can be no revolutionary strategy, no political unity and no organizational discipline. The dissolution of the PKK and the abandonment of the party form must be rejected. A Marxist Leninist Maoist party capable of representing the political will of the Kurdish nation must be built. This party must be grounded in ideological clarity, political determination, democratic centralism and revolutionary discipline. A fragmented network of civil structures cannot take the place of a revolutionary organization.
The fourth task is the re-legitimization and reorganization of revolutionary violence and guerrilla warfare. Armed struggle is not an optional or secondary method. It is the fundamental means through which an oppressed nation can resist occupation, annexation and annihilation. Guerrilla warfare must be rebuilt as the main form of struggle. This does not mean unplanned or spontaneous violence. It means the organized force of the people under the leadership of a revolutionary party. The Kurdish nation cannot achieve freedom without rebuilding its capacity for self-defense.

The fifth task is the reestablishment of an anti-imperialist line. The Kurdish national liberation struggle cannot be integrated into the strategies of the United States, Europe or any imperialist alliance. Imperialism does not liberate nations. It uses nations for its own interests. The Kurdish question must be disconnected from imperialist frameworks. Instead, alliances must be formed with oppressed peoples, revolutionary movements and anti-imperialist forces. Without this orientation, the Kurdish movement becomes dependent and loses its revolutionary autonomy.

The sixth task is the redefinition of the Kurdish national struggle as a movement of the people. The liquidationist line has transformed the Kurdish people into passive spectators waiting for negotiations and reforms. The revolutionary line must transform the people into a political subject that organizes, resists, fights and determines its own fate. The people must be rebuilt as the force of revolution. This requires ideological education, political mobilization and organizational structuring among workers, peasants, the poor and the youth.

The seventh task is to expose the colonial and annexationist character of the Turkish state. Without exposing the class and national character of the Turkish state, the Kurdish question cannot be understood or resolved. The Turkish state is not a reformable structure. It is an apparatus of oppression built on the denial of the Kurdish nation. The revolutionary line must uncover this truth and counter the illusions created by the liquidationist discourse of “dialogue,” “compromise,” and “democratic solution.”
The eighth task is the construction of revolutionary united fronts. The Kurdish national struggle is not isolated. It is part of a broader revolutionary process in the Middle East. Revolutionary unity with the peoples, oppressed nations and class movements of the region is a historical necessity. This unity must be built on anti-imperialist and anti-feudal foundations, not on identity-based or NGO-oriented frameworks.

The ninth task is the struggle against all forms of opportunism and liquidationism. The liquidationist line is not only an ideological deviation. It is a political tendency that serves the interests of the occupying state and imperialism. A revolutionary movement cannot be built unless this tendency is defeated. A clear ideological and political struggle must be waged against postmodernist, pacifist, reformist and identity-based currents within the movement.

The reconstruction of the revolutionary line is not a simple return to the past. It is the rebuilding of the Kurdish national liberation struggle on the scientific foundations of Marxism Leninism Maoism, adapted to the current conditions. This reconstruction requires political courage, organizational determination and ideological clarity.

The future of the Kurdish nation depends on this reconstruction. Either liquidation will pacify the movement and integrate it into the system, or a revolutionary line will be rebuilt and lead the Kurdish nation to liberation.

Conclusion: The Historical Meaning of the PKK’s 12th Congress and the Liquidationist Line

The ideological, political and organizational framework expressed through Abdullah Öcalan’s line and institutionalized in the PKK’s 12th Congress represents a historical rupture for the Kurdish national liberation struggle. This rupture cannot be understood merely as a change in method or a shift in strategy. Its meaning is considerably deeper. It is the transformation of a national liberation movement that emerged through decades of revolutionary struggle into a reformist, identity-based and system-compatible orientation.

From an MLM perspective, the 12th Congress represents the completion of the liquidation process. The fundamental principles of national liberation-armed struggle, the Right of Nations to Self Determination, anti-imperialist struggle, the vanguard party, Marxist Leninist ideology and revolutionary violence-have been rejected one by one. In their place, a framework shaped by postmodernism, pacifism, identity politics and liberal democratic concepts has been constructed.

This transformation represents not only the internal liquidation of the movement but also its integration into the political, military and ideological needs of the imperialist system. The Kurdish question, which for decades had been a revolutionary and destabilizing factor threatening the regional order, has been redefined as a problem that can be managed within the system. The fact that the 12th Congress elevates the concepts of “democratic nation,” “peace,” “dialogue” and “common homeland” to strategic principles indicates this shift.

However, this liquidationist orientation contradicts the historical experiences of oppressed nations. No oppressed nation has achieved liberation through reform, negotiation or cultural recognition. The experiences of Asia, Africa and Latin America demonstrate that national liberation is achieved only through revolutionary struggle, armed resistance and anti-imperialist solidarity. The Kurdish nation is no exception to this universal law. Occupation, annexation and national oppression cannot be dismantled through peace processes or moral transformation. They can only be dismantled through revolutionary rupture.

The meaning of the PKK’s 12th Congress must be evaluated within this historical framework. The Congress does not represent organizational restructuring or tactical flexibility. It represents the ideological abandonment of revolutionary struggle. It opens the door to the dissolution of the political will of the Kurdish nation and to the integration of the movement into the system.

For this reason, the reconstruction of the revolutionary line becomes a historical necessity. This reconstruction requires returning to Marxism Leninism Maoism, rebuilding the vanguard party, restoring guerrilla warfare as the main method of struggle, reestablishing the Right of Nations to Self-Determination as a strategic goal and withdrawing from imperialist integration. Without rejecting the liquidationist line, no revolutionary movement can be rebuilt.

The Kurdish national liberation struggle stands at a crossroads. Either the liquidationist process will continue and the struggle will dissolve into identity-based reformism, or a revolutionary line will be rebuilt and the Kurdish nation will reclaim its position as a political subject resisting occupation and annexation. The future of the Kurdish nation and the peoples of the region depends on this choice.

History demonstrates that oppressed nations cannot be defeated when they are organized, ideologically clear and determined to resist. The Kurdish nation also possesses this potential. What is required is ideological clarity, organizational reconstruction and revolutionary courage.

The liquidationist line does not represent the destiny of the Kurdish nation. Revolutionary liberation remains possible.