

Following the Communist Leader of the Turkish Revolution Ibrahim Kaypakkaya, Advancing on the Path of People's War!

52 years ago, Ibrahim Kaypakkaya, who was tortured to death in the Diyarbakır (Amed) prison, was not only a revolutionary leader but also the name of a historical break in the Turkish proletariat's search for its own path, the first militant banner of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism on these lands. He was someone who authentically grasped the structure, classes, state, and revolutionary tasks of this country; who rejected reformism and opportunism to chart the path of revolution. And that path is still being walked: Democratic People's Revolution, prolonged people's war, proletarian leadership line, and ideological clarity.

On this occasion, we do not limit ourselves to merely remembering the strategic legacy he left us; we act with the responsibility of reproducing it, reorganizing it, and embedding it in the consciousness of the people. Because the semi-feudal and semi-colonial structures that Kaypakkaya pointed out still remain intact in the lands we live in today. Capitalist groups are intertwined with the state, the peasantry has been dispossessed, and the working class has been condemned to insecurity. Women's labor is exploited, and nature is plundered for profit. Under imperialist dependency, the fate of the people has been abandoned to the interests of a handful of parasitic classes.

Under these conditions, our revolutionary strategy is clear: Democratic People's Revolution. This revolution will be realized through the united mobilization of the broadest sections of the people, under the leadership of a communist party, and through the path of people's war. It encompasses guerrilla warfare, the organization of the people, and revolutionary transformation as a whole. It does not deviate into parliamentarism or reformism. It keeps the revolutionary goal at the forefront under all circumstances. This strategy is not just a historical document today; it is the roadmap for tomorrow's revolutionary practice.

The struggle initiated by Kaypakkaya still retains its relevance today. As his comrades, we are determined to expand that struggle. His unwavering will, which refused to bow in the torture chambers, is rearming itself in the heart of the people today. The march of guerrillas in the countryside, the anger of workers in the cities, the rebellion of women, and the search of the youth are living witnesses to Kaypakkaya's revolutionary line.

This work both addresses the reproduction of this line under today's conditions and outlines the strategic foundation of our revolution with political clarity. It is a step not only to commemorate Kaypakkaya but to walk the path he opened and fulfill the revolutionary tasks.

Long live Ibrahim Kaypakkaya!

Long live the Democratic People's Revolution!

Long live the People's War Strategy!

Long live Marxism-Leninism-Maoism!

Ibrahim Kaypakkaya and People's War

Strategic Divergence and Revolutionary Orientation

Ibrahim Kaypakkaya's line represents not merely a difference in tendency within the Turkish revolutionary movement but a fundamental strategic break. In the debates shaping the revolutionary movement in the early 1970s, the line represented by Kaypakkaya diverged from the prevailing tendencies with its strategy of a prolonged people's war advancing from the countryside to the cities, based on a worker-peasant alliance under communist party leadership. This break is concretized primarily in the understanding of people's war and its ideological-political foundation. Kaypakkaya's conception of people's war draws on the experiences of the Chinese Revolution while being firmly rooted in Turkey's specific class structure and historical development. For him, people's war is not merely a military method but a comprehensive form of the oppressed classes' struggle for revolutionary power. In this sense, defending the people's war strategy means a radical break from parliamentary illusions, putschist tendencies, syndicalist limitations, and opportunist compromises. When Turkey's

economic, political, and social structure is examined today, it becomes clear that Kaypakkaya's people's war line is not only historical but also current and necessary.

Kaypakkaya's Strategic Position and Theoretical Line

To understand Ibrahim Kaypakkaya's conception of people's war, it is first necessary to correctly identify his theoretical and strategic position within the Turkish Revolutionary Movement. Kaypakkaya emerged during the mass upsurge of the Turkish left and revolutionary movement in the 1960s, with an orientation to construct a new revolutionary line based on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought (Maoism), surpassing the ideological and organizational limits of existing revolutionary organizations. His originality stems not only from advocating armed struggle or effecting a radical break but from achieving this break on scientific socialist foundations, with a comprehensive analysis of the state and society, and a revolutionary perspective applying Mao Zedong's people's war strategy to Turkey.

Kaypakkaya's theoretical line regards revolutionary strategy not merely as a form of struggle but as a necessary orientation grounded in the correct analysis of social reality. In this framework, the semi-feudal and semi-colonial nature of Turkey's economic and class structure forms the objective basis for the people's war strategy. The fact that this structure, shaped under imperialist domination by the comprador bourgeoisie and large landowners, cannot be dismantled through reformist or parliamentary means—nor changed revolutionarily through putschist or urban-centered uprising lines—leads to Kaypakkaya's conclusion: the Turkish revolution will achieve victory through a people's war, a prolonged armed struggle beginning in rural areas. In this respect, Kaypakkaya is the first and most comprehensive defender of the Marxism-Leninism-Maoism line in Turkey.

Carrying into practice the saying, "A revolutionary not armed with a worldview is blind," Kaypakkaya embraced not only Mao's people's war strategy but also his dialectical materialist method, theory of contradictions, solutions to contradictions within the people, and the united front approach as inseparable components of revolutionary practice. Thus, he developed a comprehensive line that viewed people's war not merely as a war tactic but as a strategy for the proletariat to lead the people's classes in seizing state power.

This wholeness led Kaypakkaya to advocate for uninterrupted revolution both in theory and practice. For him, people's war is not a strategy for reforming existing institutions but a necessary form for the total destruction of the old order and the establishment of a new order through the revolutionary mobilization of the masses under proletarian leadership. In this sense, Kaypakkaya's understanding of people's war fundamentally diverges from city-centered coup and uprising lines, legalist-reformist struggle perspectives, and the adventurist outbursts of petty-bourgeois leaderships that replace the people. Kaypakkaya's line is the true path for the people to create their own revolution.

Turkey's Objective Conditions and the Necessity of People's War

Ibrahim Kaypakkaya's understanding of people's war is based not only on ideological preferences but on a scientific analysis of Turkey's specific class structure and historical position. Kaypakkaya's fundamental finding in this area is that Turkey is a country dependent on imperialism, semi-feudal, and semi-colonial. This finding forms the basis of his revolutionary strategy. The dominance of semi-feudal production relations, the preservation of the economic and political power of large landowners, and the hegemony of a comprador-bureaucratic bourgeoisie dependent on imperialist capital within the country lead Kaypakkaya to conclude that the necessary form of democratic revolution in Turkey is an armed people's war. Under these conditions, reformist, parliamentary, or urban-centered coup and uprising strategies have no revolutionary quality. Because the class character of the state manifests not only as a repressive apparatus but also as a form of domination integrated with feudal remnants and imperialist oppression, Kaypakkaya argues that such a state can only be

overthrown by the armed struggle of the people. This struggle will primarily develop in rural areas, with a supportive and complementary character in cities.

Kaypakkaya emphasizes that feudal remnants in Turkey are effective not only economically but also politically and ideologically. Tribal relations, land monopolies, remnants of tax farming, and the exploitation that binds peasants to the state and landlords are concrete indicators of this analysis. These structures not only hinder the development of productive forces but also deprive vast peasant masses of political rights. Therefore, as Kaypakkaya puts it, “the demands of the peasantry coincide with the revolutionary goals of the proletariat.” This point of convergence is the material basis of the people’s war strategy.

Kaypakkaya analyzes the reproduction of internal dominant classes by imperialist capital through political and military domination, linking it to bureaucratic capitalism. The dependency of the comprador bourgeoisie on foreign capital shapes domestic production in line with imperialist interests. This leads to the continuous deterioration of the people’s living conditions, increased rural-to-urban migration, deepening urban poverty, and the structuralization of unemployment. All these developments create a fertile ground for people’s war: vast peasant masses and urban poor are in a historical impasse where no solution is possible except the revolutionary seizure of power.

Here, it is also important to understand how Kaypakkaya grasped Mao Zedong’s people’s war concept. Mao’s strategy of “the countryside encircling the cities” for China was not just a military orientation but expressed the fundamental strategic line determining the direction of class struggle. Kaypakkaya, in applying this to Turkey, does not merely mechanically transplant it; rather, he creatively adapts it by considering Turkey’s class components, geographic, and political specificities.

For Kaypakkaya, people’s war is not just a “feasible” struggle but a necessary and urgent one. Turkey’s class structure, the imperialist relations system, and the repressive nature of the state prove that this war is a practical necessity rather than a theoretical proposition. Kaypakkaya’s strategy is thus not only a revolutionary proposition but a necessary outcome of scientific socialism.

Theoretical Framework of the Prolonged People’s War Strategy

Ibrahim Kaypakkaya’s understanding of people’s war is based on a creative grasp and adaptation of Mao Zedong’s prolonged people’s war strategy to Turkey’s specifics. According to Mao, people’s war is not only a military strategy but a historical process where class struggle is consciously and organizedly conducted by the masses, gradually seizing political power. Kaypakkaya’s understanding of this strategy elevates him beyond being merely a proponent of armed struggle; it establishes the people’s war strategy as a break line within the Turkish revolutionary movement. The essence of people’s war lies in semi-feudal societies where the peasantry is the primary revolutionary force, initiating in rural areas and gradually spreading to cities, taking the form of a political-military-social war. This strategy aims to gradually transform the oppressed masses into revolutionary subjects and lead to the dissolution of the enemy classes’ state apparatus against the people. Kaypakkaya argues that the primary goal of people’s war in Turkey is to dismantle dominant class relations in rural areas and build the seeds of people’s power. This orientation aims to establish the independent power of the people step by step from the countryside under the ideological leadership of the proletariat.

In adapting this strategy to Turkey’s specific conditions, Kaypakkaya analyzes the geographic distribution of feudal remnants, the nature of class relations, and the forms of state repression in detail. Turkey’s semi-feudal and semi-colonial structure demonstrates that people’s war is not only possible but necessary and the only viable path. The economic structure shaped by the comprador bourgeoisie and large landowners prevents urban-centered movements from succeeding. Therefore, people’s war must be woven with a patient and mass mobilization over the long term.

For Kaypakkaya, prolonged people's war is not just a form of struggle but the shaping of a class war. He establishes a direct link between people's war and class war: revolutionary violence is a historical tool that organizes the people's force against the violence of the ruling classes. People's war enables the peasantry to be organized as a political force under proletarian leadership, transforming the masses from passive subjects into active revolutionary agents. In this process, class war is shaped not only through economic demands but through the pursuit of power. Another pillar of this theoretical framework is Kaypakkaya's correct grasp of the strategic position of the party-army-front triad. As Mao emphasized, people's war cannot be conducted solely with an armed organization; the leadership of an advanced communist party and the organized participation of the masses are essential. Kaypakkaya defines the communist party not only as an ideological leader but also as the political and organizational center itself. Armed struggle carries the political goals of this party; the people's army is not only a military but also a political organ. The task of the front is to unite various sections of the people (peasants, workers, semi-proletarians, progressive intellectuals, the left wing of the small and national bourgeoisie, etc.) in the revolutionary struggle.

The prolonged nature of people's war means that in conditions where the enemy is stronger, the struggle gradually shifts the balance of power in favor of the revolution. This requires patient preparation, political-ideological education, and the gradual expansion of people's organizations. For Kaypakkaya, impatience, adventurism, putschism, or legalist illusions are the greatest enemies of this process. Prolonged people's war is not about expecting an uprising at every moment but about constructing the people's revolutionary process in an organized manner, starting from the villages.

In these aspects, Kaypakkaya's understanding of people's war should be evaluated as a creative internalization of the global revolutionary heritage, taking into account Turkey's historical specificities. His strategic line integrates the people's war understanding with the contradictions of Turkey's geography, drawing a clear line against opportunism, revisionism, petty-bourgeois rebellion, and parliamentarism.

Ibrahim Kaypakkaya's Understanding of Organizing the Revolution: Party, Army, and Front

Ibrahim Kaypakkaya's people's war strategy is not built solely on the necessity of armed struggle; the successful execution of this struggle also requires the construction of fundamental structures—namely the Communist Party, People's Army, and United Front—as integral parts of his strategic comprehension. This approach should be seen as a creative application of Mao Zedong's people's war teachings to Turkish conditions. According to Kaypakkaya, this triad of organizations forms a functional unity within people's war and each plays a specific role in the advancement of the revolution.

Communist Party: Strategic Center, Political Vanguard, Organized and Leading Force

Stalin, in the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, defines the communist party not merely as a political structure but as a collective of organizations, describing it as the “vanguard, leader, and organized detachment.” This definition highlights three essential qualities of the party: ideological leadership, political guidance, and revolutionary organizational unity.

In Kaypakkaya's thought, the Communist Party is the primary organization providing the ideological and strategic leadership of the people's war strategy. The party represents the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist worldview, carries revolutionary consciousness to the masses, organizes the people's anger, and directs armed struggle. In this sense, the party is not only a political entity but also the bearer of ideological clarity and consistency in class struggle. The party both resolutely defends the interests of the people during the struggle and ensures that the forces fighting in the front advance toward a correct goal.

According to Kaypakkaya, this party must be illegal, composed of professional revolutionaries, and centrally organized. This approach is directly expressed in one of his eleven principles: “In organization, the party is primary, and other organizations are secondary.” Legal activities can only serve as tactical tools for the party; the essential requirement is the existence of a clandestine organization capable of resisting all forms of enemy repression and violence and sustaining a prolonged war.

People’s Army: The Main Instrument of War and the Armed Force of the Masses

The people’s army, directed by the Communist Party but organizationally distinct from it, holds a central role in Kaypakkaya’s understanding of people’s war. This army is not a classic professional or bureaucratic military force but one that draws directly from the masses, living and interacting with them. It operates with a guerrilla character, engaging in maneuver and attrition rather than direct frontal battles with the enemy; it constantly wears down the enemy, disperses its forces, and undermines its morale. The people’s army is not just a tool of war; it also serves as a carrier of revolutionary propaganda and organization. The task of the people’s army is not only to attack the enemy but to listen to the peasants’ problems, provide solutions, educate the masses, and actively involve them in the revolution by establishing direct ties with the people. This army, guided by the slogan “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun,” applies revolutionary violence while also earning the respect of the people as a disciplined and exemplary force.

Front: The Political Alliance of Broad Sections of the People

The united front, in Kaypakkaya’s understanding of people’s war, represents the aspect of the struggle that encompasses all classes within the people. Kaypakkaya argues that the people’s war process should include not only the proletariat and poor peasants but also progressive sections of the petty bourgeoisie, anti-imperialist intellectuals, representatives of oppressed nations, the left wing of the national bourgeoisie, and various democratic layers. This aligns with Mao’s New Democratic Revolution line.

The united front is neither a narrow tactical alliance nor a platform for compromising political principles. On the contrary, as the third pillar of the people’s war strategy, it serves as a tool to isolate the enemy, manage class contradictions within the people correctly, and draw the broadest possible sections of the people into the revolutionary line. This front is formed under the political leadership of the proletariat and mobilizes broad masses without deviating from its class goals.

These three structures—party, army, and front—must be considered as an inseparable whole. Kaypakkaya emphasizes that the Communist Party is the fundamental force ensuring this unity. The party directs the army, establishes and manages the front. The army carries the people’s war, defends the people, and spreads revolutionary consciousness. The front, in turn, is the basis for the masses’ revolutionary mobilization and class alliances. In this framework, Kaypakkaya’s understanding of organization contains both strategic clarity and mass-based flexibility. At every stage of the revolutionary struggle, these three pillars must complement each other and concretize the people’s war strategy.

The Strategic Position of the Peasantry and Proletarian Leadership

In Ibrahim Kaypakkaya’s understanding of people’s war, the peasantry is evaluated not merely as a numerical majority or a social layer but as the primary force on which the objective material basis of the revolution rests. This approach is directly related to Mao Zedong’s strategy developed during the Chinese Revolution, adapted to Turkish conditions. According to Kaypakkaya, the fundamental support of the revolution in Turkey is the poor and middle peasantry, and the center of gravity of the revolutionary war must be constructed in the rural areas where this class resides. Because, according to his analysis, Turkey remains a semi-feudal and semi-colonial country, and the problems of land, production, and living conditions of the vast peasant masses lie at the heart of this socio-economic structure. The strategic role Kaypakkaya assigns to the peasantry cannot be explained solely by its size or

material deprivation. For him, the peasantry is in conflict with feudal ties, large landowners, and village landlords that hinder the development of productive forces. This conflict carries potential that can be directed toward revolution. However, this potential does not inherently possess a revolutionary character. Therefore, it must be organized under proletarian leadership, imbued with a revolutionary ideological line, and channeled into people's war. At this point, proletarian leadership is of decisive importance for Kaypakkaya.

The proletariat is the carrier of revolutionary ideology and the founder of revolutionary organization. Kaypakkaya observed that peasant struggles, when devoid of leadership and ideological guidance, could devolve into reformism, petty-bourgeois rebellion, or feudal resistance forms. Thus, he argues that the peasantry must be educated, organized, and armed along a revolutionary line under the ideological-political leadership of the proletariat. This perspective is not just about constructing a revolution in rural areas; it also means definitively determining the class orientation of people's war.

Kaypakkaya is not indifferent to the historical rebellions and resistances of the peasantry. However, he notes that although these rebellions carry revolutionary potential, they become short-lived or degenerate when lacking leadership. For him, the essential factor is an ideological and organizational center capable of mobilizing this historical potential along a revolutionary line. This center is the Communist Party under proletarian leadership.

The relationship between the proletariat and the peasantry in Kaypakkaya's line is not a static alliance but a revolutionary leadership relationship based on Mao's emphasis on "the peasant war under proletarian leadership," creatively applied to Turkey. In this sense, rural areas are not only the field of people's war but also the strategic arena where the foundations of revolutionary transformation are laid. This strategic position can only achieve a genuine revolutionary transformation under the ideological and political leadership of the proletariat. The peasantry carries the revolution, while the proletariat directs it.

The prioritization of struggle in rural areas does not contradict the historical mission of the proletariat; on the contrary, it provides an objective basis for fulfilling its revolutionary tasks. Kaypakkaya, while not denying the role of the working class in cities, notes that their objective weakness and political repression prevent them from fulfilling a revolutionary leadership role in the short term. Therefore, the revolution will take shape within a people's war developing from the countryside to the cities by mobilizing the revolutionary potential of the peasantry. Thus, in Kaypakkaya's understanding of people's war, rural areas are not only a starting point but also the strategic base of the revolution. This strategic position can only achieve revolutionary transformation under the ideological and political leadership of the proletariat.

City and Countryside Dialectic: The Geographic Distribution of the Struggle

In Ibrahim Kaypakkaya's understanding of people's war, the dialectical relationship between city and countryside is not merely a matter of geographic priority or a preference for guerrilla warfare areas. This relationship is analyzed in depth in terms of the positioning of class forces, the feasibility of struggle forms, and the strategic orientation of the revolution. Adapting Mao Zedong's "encircling cities by the countryside" strategy, developed during the Chinese Revolution, to Turkey's semi-feudal and semi-colonial conditions, Kaypakkaya argues that villages, not cities, are the center of gravity for revolutionary war, supported by theoretical and practical reasoning.

According to Kaypakkaya, enemy classes are concentrated in cities: the bourgeoisie, state apparatus, strategic military centers, bureaucracy, and local representatives of imperialist capital. This does not exclude cities as a field of struggle for the proletariat; however, it renders them unsuitable as the starting point for direct revolutionary war. While the working class in cities is under repression, disorganization, and ideological siege, rural areas experience more direct contradictions with class enemies, and material living conditions provide a more suitable ground for rebellion and armed resistance.

In this context, one of Kaypakkaya's eleven principles—"activity in rural areas is primary, activity in cities is secondary"—offers a strategic framework not only for where the revolutionary struggle should begin but also for how it should be conducted. This principle does not exclude revolutionary activity in cities; rather, considering the limited opportunities and risky nature of urban areas, it suggests that urban activities should be approached as supportive, complementary, and auxiliary to the prolonged people's war in rural areas.

The city-countryside dialectic also expresses the strategic progression of the war. Kaypakkaya clearly states that the development line of people's war will be "from villages to cities." This underscores the revolutionary character of people's war while serving as an open rejection of putschist and adventurist lines aiming to realize revolution in cities. Kaypakkaya criticizes organizations like THKP-C and THKO for their city-centered guerrilla warfare and revolutionary actions disconnected from the masses, arguing that these movements exhibited a petty-bourgeois revolutionary approach, ignoring the power of the peasantry and the revolution's fundamental class ally.

According to Kaypakkaya, revolutionary struggle in cities can only be conducted in the strategic defense phase by accumulating forces, organizing, propagating, and undertaking tactical actions under suitable conditions. Mass uprisings in large cities will only become relevant in the advanced stages of people's war, after the armed struggle in villages has developed and weakened enemy forces. This approach aligns with the class character of the war and a revolutionary strategy grounded in mass support.

Moreover, the city-countryside dialectic corresponds not only to a spatial but also a class strategy. The alliance with poor peasants in rural areas and with the proletariat and semi-proletarian masses in cities strengthens the class basis of revolutionary war. Kaypakkaya sees this alliance as a key strategic necessity in the advancement of people's war. However, for this alliance to acquire a revolutionary character, the ideological leadership and organizational guidance of the proletariat are essential.

In conclusion, Kaypakkaya's city-countryside dialectic is much more than determining the progression route of revolutionary war. It is a revolutionary understanding integrated with the geographic manifestations of class struggles, strategic planning, and social organization. While the center of people's war rises in the countryside, cities are positioned both as the ultimate goal of the revolution and as areas to be encircled at the right time, exploiting the weak links of the enemy.

Criticisms Against Opportunism and Revisionism

Ibrahim Kaypakkaya's people's war strategy is not only a revolutionary war line but also an expression of ideological divergence and a form of political struggle. Therefore, the meaning Kaypakkaya ascribes to people's war is one of the fundamental lines distinguishing him from other revolutionary organizations. Postponing armed struggle, substituting it with other forms of struggle, or reducing the people's war understanding to a narrow tactical action area detached from its content is, according to Kaypakkaya, not just a tactical error but a direct deviation from the revolutionary strategy.

Kaypakkaya's criticisms of the revolutionary organizations of his time are particularly directed at the lines of THKP-C, THKO, and TİİKP. Although these structures engaged with revolutionary struggle in armed forms to varying degrees, Kaypakkaya argues that they either remained at the level of disconnected narrow activism or viewed armed struggle as an area substitutable with parliamentary processes. He labels the city-centered guerrilla line of THKP-C and THKO as marked by petty-bourgeois individualistic heroism, disconnection from the people, and adventurism. According to him, these lines failed to grasp Mao's people's war understanding, neglected the mass base of revolutionary war, and conducted urban actions disconnected from class struggle in villages.

The TİİKP line, on the other hand, represents an even deeper revisionist tendency according to Kaypakkaya. This understanding, which relies on legality, pins hopes on parliamentary

opportunities, and postpones the necessity of armed struggle, stands at the opposite pole of the people's war line. In Kaypakkaya's words, this is a line that views armed struggle not as a "vanguard war" but as a tactical activity disconnected from the vanguard, limiting class struggle to the legal arena.

This polemical direction is not limited to the Turkish revolutionary movement. Remaining loyal to Mao Zedong's struggle against revisionism, Kaypakkaya also vehemently condemns the post-Khrushchev line of the Soviet Union.

These theoretical criticisms address not only past deviations but also present revisionist lines that seek to liquidate the people's war understanding. Approaches that compromise with imperialism, drift toward parliamentarism, substitute people's war with urban uprisings, guerrilla warfare, or peaceful transition theories directly conflict with Kaypakkaya's people's war line. In this sense, his critique of opportunism and revisionism holds central importance for the ideological clarity and continuity of the people's war strategy.

Relevance and Historical Value

Ibrahim Kaypakkaya's people's war strategy expresses a revolutionary orientation based not only on the specific conditions of the 1970s but on the structural character of Turkey, possessing historical continuity. Advocating people's war as the most suitable form of struggle for a democratic people's revolution in a semi-feudal, semi-colonial social structure occupies a central place in Kaypakkaya's entire theoretical-political system. When compared with today's objective conditions, it is evident that his determinations still retain their validity. Firstly, Turkey's domination by imperialism continues through economic dependency, political orientation, and military cooperation with structures like the IMF, World Bank, and NATO. Economic exploitation policies and an industry structure dependent on imports, technology transfer, and hot money inflows demonstrate that the bureaucratic capitalism Kaypakkaya described is still inherent in the state. The bloc of comprador bourgeoisie and feudal classes he identified still represents political power and perpetuates repressive policies against the laboring masses.

Secondly, the problems faced by landless and small-scale peasants in rural areas, and the re-control of agricultural production through corporatization and contract farming in a semi-feudal manner, confirm the relevance of Kaypakkaya's understanding of organizing people's war based on the peasantry. Thirdly, the position of the proletariat within production relations and Kaypakkaya's urban-rural dialectic-based orientation still hold validity. The proletariat, largely fragmented, insecure, and un-unionized, underscores the urgent need for revolutionary organization to establish a mass base, more pressing than ever. Kaypakkaya's tactic of "accumulating forces and seizing opportunities" in cities correctly highlights the limits of urban organization under current repressive conditions.

Fourthly, it is observed globally that people's wars remain a valid form of struggle. Kaypakkaya's theoretical perspective is not limited to Turkey but aligns with the struggle forms of the international proletariat.

Finally, within today's political atmosphere, against revisionist approaches that declare people's war invalid-substituting it with parliamentarism, organization limited to legalism, or identity-based orientations-Kaypakkaya's line still offers a robust ideological alternative. His line is not only a strategic orientation but also a proposal for constructing the political subjecthood practice of the people. In this sense, the strategic necessity and historical legitimacy of people's war are clearly expressed in Kaypakkaya's thought.

The Revolutionary Legacy of Kaypakkaya's People's War Understanding

Ibrahim Kaypakkaya's understanding of people's war is the product of a break that laid the historical and theoretical foundations of the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist line in Turkey. His strategic orientation is not merely a preference for a form of struggle but a comprehensive revolutionary theory that correctly grasps Turkey's class structure, state form, imperialist influences, and the role of the revolutionary subject. In this respect, people's war is both the

method and process of revolutionary transformation in Kaypakkaya's theoretical system. Kaypakkaya's people's war understanding is ideologically based on the independent class interests of the proletariat, politically centers on the struggle for power, and organizationally relies on the strategic unity of the Party-Army-Front triad. He aimed for the masses to become not only a protest against oppressors but also active revolutionary subjects capable of establishing a new order. In this sense, people's war is not merely the sum of armed conflicts but the gradual and conscious construction of a new class power. Kaypakkaya's people's war understanding represents a clear ideological stance against both internal ideological deviations and externally influenced revisionist tendencies. It contains the continuity, discipline, and goals of proletarian revolutionary practice against parliamentarism, legalism, putschism, or spontaneous uprisings. In this framework, the people's war strategy systematized by his eleven principles remains the only valid strategic path suited to Turkey's concrete conditions. Today, Kaypakkaya's legacy is embodied not only in his writings or life but in the people's war practices, organizational forms, and relationships with the masses of those continuing his line. This legacy is a political-military program encompassing theoretical clarity against modern revisionism, militant determination against fascism, and deep responsibility toward the masses. Every understanding that declares the people's war strategy invalid directly contradicts this revolutionary legacy. Kaypakkaya's people's war understanding remains filled with scientific guidance necessary for the liberation of the oppressed. His line charts the long, arduous, yet revolutionary course of the people's struggle to establish their own power, equipping every subject advancing on this path with ideological grounding. The reconstruction of the communist movement in Turkey depends on grasping, embracing, and creatively applying this legacy to the needs of the era.

Ibrahim Kaypakkaya's Revolutionary Synthesis

Ibrahim Kaypakkaya formulated the path, methods, struggle forms, organizational priorities and subordinations, and the dialectical interconnections of all these as the "11 Principles" for the Turkish revolution:

Strategy and Tactics in Light of the 11 Principles

Ibrahim Kaypakkaya's people's war strategy is not merely a general orientation; it is a content systematized with specific principles, establishing clear distinctions between strategy and tactics, and guiding their application in practice. Developed with the founding of the TKP/ML, this strategic-tactical understanding is formulated around 11 basic principles. Each expresses a fundamental preference and orientation regarding one aspect of the revolutionary struggle. These principles provide comprehensive answers to questions about what people's war is against, in what form, and with what tools it should be conducted.

The principles were developed considering concrete factors such as the balance of forces, class structure, political environment, geographic conditions, and the structural weaknesses of the revolutionary movement. In this context, they serve as a safeguard against conflating strategy with tactics, and as a clear ideological-political stance against short-term success pursuits or urban-centered revolutionary understandings.

Kaypakkaya's articulation of these 11 principles also represents a reckoning with the different lines within the Turkish revolutionary movements. It marks a radical theoretical break from the "from cities to countryside" orientation of the People's Liberation Army of Turkey (THKO), the urban guerrilla emphasis of the People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey (THKP-C), and the legalist revolutionary imagination of the Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Party of Turkey (TİİKP). Each principle defends the necessity of people's war not only at an ideological level but also at practical and organizational levels.

These principles are not merely organizational guidelines or political attitudes; they are concrete forms of a revolutionary worldview, people's war theory, and a strategic comprehension of class struggle. Each enables Kaypakkaya to position himself not as

someone merely transmitting Mao but as a communist leader integrating it with Turkey's social and political reality.

1. Activity in rural areas is primary, activity in cities is secondary.

This principle determines the fundamental spatial orientation of the people's war strategy. It is based on Mao Zedong's principle, successfully applied during the Chinese Revolution, that the revolution should begin in rural areas and ultimately encircle the cities through prolonged people's war. Kaypakkaya, taking into account Turkey's specific class and geographic conditions, openly embraced and theoretically grounded this orientation. The socio-economic structure of Turkey forms the basis of this preference. Kaypakkaya identifies Turkey as a semi-feudal, semi-colonial country where class relations are largely defined by the peasantry, and the dominance of large landowners persists most harshly in rural areas. In this structure, the peasantry constitutes both the broadest laboring section and the layer experiencing the most direct contradictions against state repression, landlord exploitation, and imperialist encirclement. Thus, rural areas are not only a "starting point" but also the most fertile ground for people's war, a support base for revolutionary forces, and the geography where the people's revolutionary potential is most concentrated.

Kaypakkaya's approach to cities is shaped accordingly. Cities, largely under the military, economic, and political control of the enemy, render a revolutionary line targeting direct power through uprisings largely adventurist and liquidating. Therefore, urban activities should be kept secondary, primarily serving to spread revolutionary propaganda, accumulate forces among the masses, and establish connection points with villages. Urban activities should be positioned as extensions of and subordinate to rural activities.

This principle also constitutes a direct critique of lines like THKP-C and THKO, which based their struggles on city centers. Kaypakkaya views the urban guerrilla approaches of these organizations as adventurist and disconnected from the mass revolutionary war line, asserting that the revolution will develop as a "prolonged people's war" only with a solid foundation in rural areas. In this sense, rather than saying "revolution cannot happen in cities," he advances the view that "cities can only be conquered revolutionarily with the power built in rural areas."

This principle, still valid today, demonstrates that revolutionary struggle should be constructed not through "instant" urban outbursts but through a long-term process in rural areas. Especially in the present day, with the state's technological power, its control capacity in cities, and the deepening class disintegration, establishing the material bases of people's war in villages has become an even more urgent necessity. The reconstruction of the revolutionary movement, its correct strategic positioning, and its connection with the class can only be achieved by seriously grasping this orientation.

2. Armed struggle is primary, other forms of struggle are secondary.

This principle lies at the heart of Kaypakkaya's people's war understanding and clearly establishes the compulsory nature of the strategy he proposes for the Turkish revolution. According to Kaypakkaya, in a semi-feudal, semi-colonial country like Turkey, the path to revolution passes through the armed organization of the masses and the construction of revolutionary violence against the state's monopoly on violence. In this context, armed struggle is not merely a form of struggle but the backbone, form, and strategic orientation of the revolution itself. Kaypakkaya explicitly states that the idea of "revolution through peaceful means" is an illusion and that such views ignore the counter-revolutionary violence apparatus in semi-colonial countries under imperialist control. The underdeveloped nature of bourgeois democracy in Turkey, the continuity of the fascist state structure, and the systematic military and paramilitary repression in rural areas demonstrate that revolutionary struggle cannot be sustained outside armed forms. Therefore, armed struggle is both necessary and the primary form of struggle to be adopted.

With this principle, Kaypakkaya also targets reformist and legalist tendencies. He openly condemns lines that limit revolutionary struggle to the legal arena or argue that class struggle can be conducted through parliamentary tools. With this approach, he clarifies his break from the TİİKP and Mihri Belli lines. He regards the legal-centric attitudes of these groups as contrary to the nature of class struggle, asserting that without basing revolutionary violence theoretically and practically, the boundaries of the bourgeois order cannot be transcended.

The primacy of armed struggle also means grasping the holistic nature of people's war. This form of struggle should not be seen solely as a military activity but as a political-military process sustained by the organized power of the people. Guerrilla units must be structures that defend the interests of the people, live among them, and provide political leadership. In this sense, people's war must directly rely on the masses, developing with their support, educating them, and carrying a character that politicizes them. Kaypakkaya does not absolutely separate armed struggle from other forms; activities like propaganda, agitation, strikes, and boycotts are legitimate as long as they serve the development of revolutionary war. However, the fundamental line determining the direction and form of these activities is their contribution to the development process of armed struggle. Therefore, the priority of armed struggle necessitates the alignment of other tools accordingly.

For Kaypakkaya, the material and class basis of the Turkish revolution makes armed struggle a necessity beyond preference. This form of struggle is not just a tool but a strategy identical with the revolution itself. Thus, it is vital for revolutionary forces to possess an organization, struggle form, and ideological line suited to this strategy.

3. Illegal activity is primary, legal activity is secondary.

In Ibrahim Kaypakkaya's people's war strategy, the primacy of illegal activity is directly related to the fascist state structure in Turkey. Turkey is not only a semi-feudal, semi-colonial country but also a state organized as an overt fascist dictatorship to sustain the class dominance of the comprador-bureaucratic bourgeoisie and large landowners. The repressive apparatuses of this fascist state—army, police, intelligence, judiciary, and paramilitary structures—systematically suppress even the smallest democratic demands and unconditionally target revolutionary activity.

Under these conditions, the primary nature of revolutionary struggle being illegal stems not only from security concerns but from the class nature and ideological structure of the state. In a fascist state, revolutionary activity cannot be conducted within legal boundaries. Open activity leads to the immediate exposure of cadres, the organization, and the masses to the enemy. Kaypakkaya's stance on this is clear: this is not just a tactical issue but a strategic one. In this regard, Kaypakkaya harshly criticizes reformist and legalist tendencies—those that seek to confine revolutionary struggle within the legal framework of the system. He exposes the arguments of structures like TİİKP, such as “pushing the limits of the legal arena” or “conducting open activities,” as opportunistic attitudes that ignore the fascist class character of the state and attempt to realize revolution within bourgeois boundaries. For him, conducting revolutionary activity openly in a country waging people's war is tantamount to surrender to the enemy from the outset.

Illegality is not merely about hiding or protection. It is also a condition for the revolutionary organization to break free from the political-ideological hegemony of the bourgeois order. A movement confined to the legal arena gradually becomes subject to the legal system, legitimacy framework, and public oversight of the order. This erodes the revolutionary orientation, weakens organizational independence, and paralyzes the spirit of class struggle.

Therefore, Kaypakkaya considers it essential for the party's organizational style, cadre activities, and propaganda tools to be built on an illegal basis. This necessity is not unique to Turkey but a universal requirement of the prolonged people's war strategy. Mao Zedong clearly emphasized that in the initial phase of people's war—particularly during the strategic defense period—when the enemy is far stronger than revolutionary forces, a movement style

based on secrecy, infiltration, encirclement, and intelligence is mandatory. Kaypakkaya's understanding of illegality is directly linked to this Maoist strategic orientation.

Legal activity is not absolutely rejected in this framework; however, it must be subordinate to the revolutionary line and needs. Legal tools can only be used for revolutionary propaganda, reaching the masses, or tactical interventions. However, their independence risks damaging the spirit of revolutionary struggle. Kaypakkaya opposes the fetishization of legality, tendencies to conduct politics within the boundaries of the order, and any orientation contrary to the essence of people's war.

This principle offers not only an ideological framework but also a determinant in practice. Methods such as cell-type organization, disciplined work style, establishing secret mass connections, secure communication networks, and underground publishing are indispensable to illegality. The essential goal is to construct a revolutionary presence invisible to the enemy but known to the people. This is not just an organizational form but a revolutionary lifestyle and war style.

Kaypakkaya's strategic emphasis on illegality holds a decisive position for the feasibility of people's war under fascist state conditions. His line represents an open and radical break from legalist and reformist tendencies at organizational, ideological, and strategic levels.

4. As long as the enemy is stronger than us nationwide, strategic defense is primary.

This principle, of decisive importance in Ibrahim Kaypakkaya's people's war understanding, directly adopts Mao Zedong's theory of prolonged people's war with its strategic phases: strategic defense, strategic equilibrium, and strategic offense. This historical and universal three-stage process is a scientific framework, determined according to the objective balance of forces, for the oppressed classes to advance toward the goal of power in every revolutionary war. Kaypakkaya adapted this strategic logic to Turkish conditions; while acknowledging the enemy's strength, he viewed this as a dynamic process that could be overcome through the development of revolutionary activity. During the strategic defense phase, revolutionary forces are still weak; numerically small and qualitatively underdeveloped. The enemy, however, holds all the repressive and coercive apparatuses of the state, ideological tools, and economic resources, possessing every means to suppress the revolutionary movement. Under these conditions, calls for direct uprisings or mass revolts lead to the liquidation of the revolutionary movement. Kaypakkaya, in line with Mao, emphasizes that strategic defense is mandatory when the enemy is strong and the people are yet unorganized, opposing "premature birth" or "quick victory" understandings.

The essence of strategic defense lies not in launching a total attack on the enemy but in striking its weak points to grow revolutionary forces, organize the masses, educate cadres, spread political consciousness, and plant the seeds of armed power. This period involves establishing guerrilla units, laying the foundations of the people's army, and deepening the roots of the party. During the strategic defense phase, where the enemy is strong, the tempo of people's war is determined not by the enemy's weak spots but by the development process of the revolutionary movement itself.

In this respect, Kaypakkaya's people's war strategy fundamentally conflicts with notions of "overnight power" or "victory through urban uprisings." His strategy is a long-term one, based on the development of the people's consciousness and organization, and the gradual accumulation of material forces. Kaypakkaya's understanding of strategic defense also aims to dissolve the enemy ideologically, politically, and militarily. While armed struggle inflicts actual attrition, it simultaneously gains legitimacy among the people. As guerrilla units grow, the enemy's dominance weakens in certain areas. State authority in rural regions fragments, and liberated zones—the foundation of people's war—are gradually constructed. In this context, there are significant differences between Kaypakkaya's revolutionary line and revisionist tendencies that liquidate the people's war understanding. For instance, "initiating the revolution" or "inciting mass uprisings" through urban armed actions contradicts the logic

of strategic defense. Likewise, targeting power directly without organizing the masses and prioritizing armed struggle has historically resulted in major defeats. The primacy of strategic defense means grounding the revolutionary movement in reality, avoiding adventurist moves, and growing the revolution on the basis of concrete forces. Kaypakkaya's principle reflects both the strategic patience and revolutionary persistence of the Maoist people's war understanding.

5. Within strategic defense, tactical offensives are primary, tactical defense is secondary.

This principle in Ibrahim Kaypakkaya's people's war understanding is one of the clearest manifestations of the creative application of Mao Zedong's military strategy to the Turkish revolution. Adopting Mao's formula of "strategic defense but tactical offense," Kaypakkaya re-theorized this approach within Turkey's semi-colonial, semi-feudal conditions.

Strategic defense defines a period where the enemy is generally superior, and revolutionary forces are still in the construction phase. However, this period is not one of passive waiting; it is a phase where revolutionary initiative is organized, the foundations of people's war are laid, and political-military preparation intensifies. As Kaypakkaya puts it, revolutionary forces "should not wait for the enemy's attack but strike it in specific areas, under specific conditions, with revolutionary initiative."

The importance of tactical offensives lies not only in being a reaction to defense but in their strategic role in advancing revolutionary war. Tactical offensives are operations targeting the enemy's weak points, aiming to destroy in parts, wear down enemy forces, shatter their morale, and gain territory. These attacks enhance the legitimacy of revolutionary forces among the people, boost the masses' confidence, and expand the material basis of revolutionary organization.

Kaypakkaya's approach to this principle insists that military targets must be aligned with political goals. Tactical offensives, directed at small enemy garrisons, transportation and communication networks, economic resources, and local administrative apparatuses, do more than cause physical damage; they break the fear of the state, encouraging mass participation in the revolutionary struggle.

In this context, tactical defense is resorted to only under compulsory conditions-such as escaping encirclement, protecting cadres, or retreating in unprepared areas. Kaypakkaya criticizes the stagnation of revolutionary forces in a defensive position focused solely on survival or concealment. The essential goal is to maintain revolutionary initiative even with the most limited means, keep the enemy under constant pressure, and expand political-military preparation.

This understanding also serves as an ideological intervention against opportunist tendencies. Reducing armed struggle to mere defense leads to the ineffectiveness and eventual dissolution of guerrilla units. However, an important distinction must be made: urban tactical actions are not rejected by people's war; when conducted with correct goals and in alignment with the strategic line, they are an indispensable part of revolutionary war. What is criticized is elevating these actions into a standalone war strategy-not the acts of armed propaganda and revolutionary agitation themselves.

Within people's war, tactical actions in cities can play multifaceted roles, such as undermining the enemy's morale, enabling the revolutionary voice to reach broad masses, and supporting strategic defense. The decisive factor in Kaypakkaya's line is that these actions are carried out under the party's guidance, based on a mass foundation, and in service of the revolutionary war's goals.

In conclusion, this principle confirms that people's war is not only a military struggle form but also a strategic line targeting political power. The spirit of guerrilla warfare lies in organizing tactical offensives to channel the people's energy into revolution. These offensives do more than weaken the enemy; they are concrete steps that enable the masses' consciousness, organization, and direct participation in the revolution. As Kaypakkaya states,

revolutionary forces do not merely wait for conditions but create their own, advancing the war.

6. In the strategic defense period, guerrilla warfare is primary within armed struggle in villages, other forms of struggle are secondary.

In Ibrahim Kaypakkaya's people's war strategy, rural areas are not only a starting point but also the fundamental arenas where the social foundations of people's war are established, the people are organized, and revolutionary violence integrates with the masses. Accordingly, this principle designates guerrilla warfare as the primary form of armed struggle in villages, with all other activities serving this struggle. This principle is based on Mao Zedong's fundamental proposition during the Chinese Revolution: that people's war should begin in rural areas and advance toward cities through strategic encirclement. Kaypakkaya, considering Turkey's class and geographic structure and the persistent intensity of semi-feudal production relations in rural areas, asserts that the central hub of revolutionary struggle must be the villages. For him, while the urban working-class movement is fragmented and under control, the anger rising against large landowners in rural areas holds the potential for direct revolutionary war. Guerrilla warfare, in Kaypakkaya's strategy, is not limited to armed conflict; it also encompasses the organization of the people, the establishment of people's committees, the creation of people's courts, and the revolutionary transformation of rural governance. Guerrilla units live with the people, share their needs, provide education, deliver healthcare, and thus gain the people's trust, legitimizing armed struggle. During this period, other struggle forms in villages—such as economic struggles, agitation-propaganda, and mass education—are complementary to guerrilla warfare. However, Kaypakkaya does not view any of these as the primary form of struggle; rather, they gain value only to the extent they serve the development of guerrilla warfare. Since revolutionary violence is understood as the sole path to the people's liberation, weakening or substituting it distorts the essence of the revolution. At this point, Kaypakkaya's ideological clarity is evident in his criticisms against reformism and pacifism. He condemns the approach of revisionist movements like TIİKP, which prioritize agitation-propaganda in rural areas and delay armed struggle, arguing that postponing revolutionary violence also delays the militancy and organization of the masses. Moreover, this principle reveals that people's war is a continuous, organized war form qualitatively different from one-off actions or spontaneous rebellions. Guerrilla warfare is not the spark of revolutionary war but the revolution itself. This understanding treats guerrillas not merely as military units but as political and ideological organizations. The principle that armed struggle, with guerrilla warfare as primary and other forms as secondary in villages, is the logical and necessary outcome of the strategy to construct people's war's social base in rural areas. It charts the practical route for the people's consciousness, the creation of revolutionary power zones, and the encirclement of cities.

7. In cities (large cities), during the strategic defense period, accumulating forces and seizing opportunities are primary, organizing uprisings is secondary.

In Ibrahim Kaypakkaya's people's war strategy, the role of cities is supportive, auxiliary, and subordinate to the revolutionary struggle in rural areas, in line with Mao Zedong's "encircling cities from the countryside" strategy adapted creatively to Turkish conditions. Kaypakkaya advocates not for the direct evolution of revolutionary war into a central conflict in cities but, during the strategic defense phase, for the organization, accumulation, and patient exploitation of opportunities by revolutionary forces in urban areas.

This approach is based on a concrete analysis of Turkey's socio-economic structure and the state's control capacity in cities. According to Kaypakkaya, large cities are under tight military and political control by enemy forces. With police, intelligence, military, and ideological apparatuses concentrated in cities, and class struggle suppressed under the ideological hegemony of the bourgeoisie, open armed uprising tactics cannot be applied in the early stages. Instead, the primary task of revolutionary forces in cities is to take root among

the working class and laborers, establish revolutionary structures, train vanguard cadres, and, when necessary, develop actions targeting the enemy's weak points to support the rural war.

In this regard, Kaypakkaya considers organizing uprisings in cities as secondary during strategic defense conditions. For him, sudden and mass uprising actions in cities lead to the consumption of revolutionary forces before they are built, the activation of the enemy's counter-revolutionary apparatuses, and a direction contrary to the logic of people's war. Cities can only become the central conflict zone of the revolution in its advanced stages, in conjunction with the encircling power from the countryside.

At this point, Kaypakkaya directs criticisms at other revolutionary organizations—particularly the putschist lines of THKO and THKP-C with their “urban revolutionary uprising” approach. He highlights the disconnection from the masses, class character, and strategic weakness of movements based on rapid victory through armed actions in cities, emphasizing that this line is incompatible with the mass-based revolutionary character of people's war.

However, the secondary nature of urban activities does not mean they are insignificant. On the contrary, these activities must have a content that serves, supports, and prepares the rural war, wears down the enemy, and readies the masses for revolution. Activities like strikes, neighborhood organizations, propaganda, and sabotage fall within the tactical options to be developed in cities during this period. Yet none of these are decisive enough to determine the central direction of people's war.

This principle reflects Kaypakkaya's patient approach to the role of cities in his revolutionary strategy. Urban activities function as a complementary element of strategic encirclement; city uprisings become feasible only in the advanced stages of people's war, after the strengthening of revolutionary base areas and the strategic weakening of the enemy.

8. In organization, party organization is primary, other organizations are secondary.

The issue of organization holds a central position in Ibrahim Kaypakkaya's people's war understanding. In this context, the eighth principle emphasizes that the communist party must be positioned as the subject and guiding force of the revolutionary struggle, with all organizational forms, actions, and alliances shaped under its leadership and in line with its strategic orientation. To understand the essence of this principle, it is necessary to first examine how Kaypakkaya defines the revolutionary party. For him, the communist party is the organizational nucleus that carries the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology to the masses, aligns their class interests with a scientific direction, directs the war, and channels mass movements toward a conscious goal. A people's war without a party is doomed to randomness and the swamp of reformism. Therefore, in Kaypakkaya's view, the party is not merely a union of vanguards but a war organization that will establish and manage people's war step by step.

In Kaypakkaya's theoretical analysis, other organizations-fronts, unions, youth associations, women's organizations, etc.-only hold value to the extent they adhere to this central structure's strategic goals. The primacy of party organization does not imply the absolute submission of other organizational forms but the formation of a cohesive unity that complements each other and operates in the direction of people's war. The party organization is the founding will that determines political goals, sets orientations, defines class character, and frames all action forms strategically.

Kaypakkaya takes a firm stance against the ideas of “movements,” “mass initiatives,” or “multi-centered structures” outside the party, promoted by opportunist and revisionist lines. He argues that conducting the communist movement through fragmented and ideologically-organizationally ambiguous structures weakens the revolutionary process and renders its continuity impossible. Thus, the existence of an illegal, disciplined, and ideologically clear communist party is an indispensable condition for people's war.

The primacy of party organization is not only an ideological leadership but also emerges in the process of creating a cadre system, training armed forces, and establishing organic ties

with the masses. In this respect, the party is not just a planner of people's war strategy but also its direct implementer and organizer. Especially in wartime, the party's function extends beyond propaganda or political orientation; it establishes an army, creates a front, and constructs people's power. The approach formulated in this principle demonstrates Kaypakkaya's comprehension of the organizational issue as a military-political whole. A communist party representing the independent class interests of the masses, organizing and guiding them, must be at the center of all other organizations. The victory of people's war depends on such a party organization being both a vanguard and a guiding force.

9. Within other organizations, armed struggle organizations are primary.

The principles Ibrahim Kaypakkaya established regarding organization in his people's war strategy do not pertain only to the formal existence of organizations but introduce a hierarchy of priorities based on their revolutionary functions and roles within concrete struggle. In this context, the ninth principle emphasizes that armed struggle organizations must be placed at the center of all other organizational forms from the perspective of the people's war strategy. According to Kaypakkaya, since people's war is considered an armed struggle form, the fundamental organizational apparatuses that will conduct and manage this war will be armed organizations. These armed struggle organizations are not merely technical military units; they are political organs that directly engage with the people, politicize the masses, create the seeds of people's power, and organize revolutionary counter-violence against the repression and domination of enemy classes.

In this regard, guerrilla units, in Kaypakkaya's strategy, are not limited to armed conflict; they also involve the organization of the people, the establishment of people's committees, the creation of people's courts, and the revolutionary transformation of rural governance. Guerrilla units live with the people, share their needs, provide education, deliver healthcare, and thus gain the people's trust, legitimizing armed struggle. During this period, other struggle forms in villages—such as economic struggles, agitation-propaganda, and mass education—are complementary to guerrilla warfare. However, Kaypakkaya does not view any of these as the primary form of struggle; rather, they gain value only to the extent they serve the development of guerrilla warfare. Since revolutionary violence is understood as the sole path to the people's liberation, weakening or substituting it distorts the essence of the revolution. At this point, Kaypakkaya's ideological clarity is evident in his criticisms against reformism and pacifism. He condemns the approach of revisionist movements like TİİKP, which prioritize agitation-propaganda in rural areas and delay armed struggle, arguing that postponing revolutionary violence also delays the militancy and organization of the masses.

Moreover, this principle reveals that people's war is a continuous, organized war form qualitatively different from one-off actions or spontaneous rebellions. Guerrilla warfare is not the spark of revolutionary war but the revolution itself. This understanding treats guerrillas not merely as military units but as political and ideological organizations. The principle that armed struggle, with guerrilla warfare as primary and other forms as secondary in villages, is the logical and necessary outcome of the strategy to construct people's war's social base in rural areas. It charts the practical route for the people's consciousness, the creation of revolutionary power zones, and the encirclement of cities.

10. Relying on our own forces is primary, relying on allies is secondary.

This principle, occupying a central place in Ibrahim Kaypakkaya's people's war strategy, presents the fundamental logic of the organizational and political line to be followed in revolutionary struggle. Kaypakkaya, adapting Mao Zedong's principles of standing on one's own feet and trusting one's own strength to Turkish conditions, argues that the revolution cannot be based solely on external or temporary alliances but must rise through its own social foundations and intrinsic power. This principle defines the relationship between tactical flexibility and strategic independence while expressing an ideological orientation that condemns opportunist deviations.

This approach is directly linked to Kaypakkaya's characterization of the struggle against imperialism, social-imperialism, revisionism, and the domestic comprador-bureaucratic bloc. The revolution in Turkey is not an externally imported change or one to be realized with the support of "great powers" but a revolution achieved through the organized struggle and intrinsic power of the people. This understanding applies not only to external forces but also serves as a strong warning against internal alliances that substitute the revolutionary will. The revolutionary subject is constructed within the people, in their self-organizations, and through their material and ideological capacities. Allied forces can only be complementary actors in this process, not the determining power of the revolutionary course.

Kaypakkaya's approach condemns two major errors of significant sections of the Turkish left movement of his time. The first is the tendency to tie the revolution strategy to external dynamics, particularly the social-imperialist Soviet Union or its guided revisionist lines. This approach, despite appearing anti-imperialist, drifts into a passive stance within imperialist power balances. The second is the classless understanding that substitutes the role of the revolutionary subject by relying on internal alliances, effectively negating proletarian leadership. Kaypakkaya openly condemns both tendencies, emphasizing that people's war can only rise through its internal dynamics.

However, the statement "relying on allies is secondary" does not mean Kaypakkaya rejects united front and alliance policies. On the contrary, the importance of revolutionary alliances among the people's classes is emphasized in the people's war process; however, these alliances must be subordinate to proletarian leadership as a fundamental principle. The strategic subject is the Communist Party; all other allies are functionalized in line with this strategic orientation. The united front, in this context, is not a driving force of the revolution but a tool guided by revolutionary leadership.

In Kaypakkaya's principle, echoes of Mao's basic theses, repeatedly emphasized during the initial phases of the Chinese Revolution, are heard: "The revolution must rely on its own strength. Success is the result of the people's own heroic struggle, not others'." This perspective demonstrates that people's war is not only an ideological orientation but also a struggle form constructed on the basis of organizational independence and mass mobilization. Consequently, the principle "relying on our own forces is primary, relying on allies is secondary" is the principle of preserving the independent, populist, and proletarian character of people's war. This understanding determines the direction of revolutionary struggle while serving as a strong ideological shield against external interventions and internal opportunism.

11. Conditions for armed struggle exist in our country. This principle holds a decisive place in Ibrahim Kaypakkaya's people's war understanding, both theoretically and practically. Kaypakkaya, based on the specific class and political structure of Turkey, argues that armed struggle is not merely a preference but a necessity. This approach is grounded in his historical materialist analysis of Turkey as a semi-feudal, semi-colonial country, rooted in the nature of its societal contradictions. The state in Turkey has a fascist character and has institutionalized its dominance as a fascist dictatorship. Thus, the necessity of revolutionary war is not an ideological or strategic preference but a product of objective conditions.

According to Kaypakkaya, the ruling classes in Turkey—large landowners, the comprador bourgeoisie, and the imperialist centers they depend on—can only maintain power through repression and force. These classes keep the broad masses under economic, political, and cultural subjugation, suppressing all societal contradictions through systematic violence. In this sense, the nature of the state is overtly class-based: an armed apparatus organized against the proletariat and peasantry. Under these conditions, conducting revolutionary struggle through peaceful, parliamentary, or reformist means is unrealistic and opportunistic. The repressive mechanisms of the ruling classes necessitate that the people's liberation can only be achieved through armed struggle.

This approach is also evident in Kaypakkaya's criticisms of structures like TİİKP. He argues that denying or postponing the objective conditions for armed struggle obstructs the path of the Turkish revolution and drags worker-peasant masses into pacifism. These criticisms target not only the revolution strategy but also the revolutionary subject's connection with the masses, tactical struggle forms, and political orientations. For Kaypakkaya, the revolution in Turkey can only be conducted through a people's war strategy based on armed struggle; all other paths equate to class compromise or surrender.

The statement "conditions for armed struggle exist" also implies the presence of subjective conditions—namely, the reaction of the masses, the intensity of their poverty and anger, and the revolutionary movement's claim to leadership. In Turkey, the peasantry still constitutes a significant population majority and lives under the harshest economic-social conditions. Agricultural production relations retain their semi-feudal character, and the revolutionary potential of landless and small-scale peasants remains alive. Kaypakkaya points to this objectivity as the material basis of people's war.

Moreover, this principle is not just a finding of the past but also forms the basis of the revolutionary strategy for the present. The increasing repression by the rulers, the deepening of fascist governance forms, the manipulation of electoral processes, and the detachment of parliamentary opportunities from the people's will reaffirm the objective necessity of armed struggle, and thus people's war, today. The material bases of revolutionary war remain not only historical but also currently valid.

This principle reveals both the theoretical correctness and historical necessity of people's war in a country like Turkey. Armed struggle is not an idealistic orientation but the compulsory form of revolutionary practice. All components of Kaypakkaya's people's war understanding rest on this fundamental principle: revolutionary violence is the legitimate right of the people to resist the violence of the ruling classes.